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8 April 1966

COMMUNIST CHINA'S NATIONAL STRATEGY IN LATIN AMERICA

By

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Thesis

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Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania
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SUMMARY

Since the Sino-Soviet split became apparent in 1960, Communist Chinese foreign policy throughout the world has taken an increasingly independent trend. In the underdeveloped regions of Asia, Africa, and Latin America this new thrust has become particularly discernible.

This thesis is an initial effort to define a probable Chinese Communist national strategy toward Latin America. Perhaps such an undertaking is premature, in that such a short time has elapsed since Red China generated its independent attitude. Perhaps the Peoples' Republic of China does not yet have the capability to implement, or even the desire for, a separate national strategy in the region. This paper contends that they do.

A review of the history of Communism in Latin America reveals early Chinese interest and activity. Allied with the Soviet Union in ideology and purpose, the Chinese have pursued an aggressive policy of organizing their limited strength and exploiting regional weaknesses. An examination of the contemporary Latin American arena, reveals fertile areas for further Communist inroads.

To a large extent the Chinese continue their alliance with the Soviets in pursuit of the common objectives of weakening United States influence and expanding Communism in Latin America. However, the Cuban revolution and the increasing fervor of the Sino-Soviet dispute have interjected new and somewhat enigmatic dimensions into Communist regional strategies. Castro seeks to export the Cuban brand of revolution to other Latin American nations, and Castro-Communism coincides more closely with the Chinese viewpoint than with the Soviets'. Therefore, although apparently not inspired by Peking, the Cuban coincidence of purpose is a boon to the Chinese in their independent objectives of dominating the Communist movement in Latin America.

An analysis of capabilities and intent concludes that the Chinese possess both the means and the will to pursue these strategic objectives in Latin America. Furthermore, careful scrutiny of the indicators on the world scene points to specific courses of action to support the attainment of these goals.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

"Everything is divisible, and so is the colossus of U.S. imperialism. It can be split up and defeated. The peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America--can destroy it piece by piece, some striking at its head and others at its feet."

Lin Piao, 2 Sep 1965

GENERAL STRATEGY

One may visualize Communist China's ambitions in foreign affairs in terms of three concentric circles, the innermost of which is China's desire to restore Peiping's control over all areas China regards as her own. The second circle represents Peiping's objective to regain control over areas adjacent to China's borders, which at certain times in the past have been under Chinese domination. The third and outer of the concentric circles would be the achievement of great power status complete with nuclear weapons and becoming the dominant force in the world of tomorrow. These objectives are simultaneously pursued.¹

A review of Red China's brief history tends to support this general analysis by the U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs. The 1951 conquest of Tibet was surely in implementation of the first ambition. The Korean intervention, the threats against Taiwan, and the incursion into disputed territories of India might be said to be illustrations of the second goal.

¹Marshall Green, "Communist China: A Problem in U.S. Policymaking," Department of State Foreign Affairs Outline, No. 11, May 1965, p. 2.

Further, one might point to the split with the Soviet Union, the atomic detonations of 1964 and 1965 and Chinese activities in Albania and Africa as examples of efforts directed toward the third objective. Indeed, many of these incidents overlapped in time, to lend credence to the assertion that all goals are pursued simultaneously.

Any Chinese Communist activity in Latin America quite logically would lie in the outer circle of her ambitions. Far removed geographically from China's limited power base on the Asian mainland, the region is, nonetheless, vital to the realization of her great power status. For the ultimate enemy of Red China is US imperialism,² and Latin America lies on the immediate flank of its core. As Marshal Lin Piao, the Chinese Minister of Defense expressed it in September 1965, "Today the conditions are more favorable than ever before for waging the peoples' war by the revolutionary peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America against US imperialism and its lackeys."³ In the light of these circumstances, there can be little doubt that Red China is out to extend its influence in the so-called underdeveloped regions of the world, and Latin America is an important, though remote, element of Communist China's national strategy.

²"US imperialism is the most rabid aggressor in human history and the most ferocious common enemy of the people of the world. Every people or country in the world that wants revolution, independence and peace cannot but point the spearhead of its struggles against US imperialism." Lin Piao, "Long Live the Victory of the People's War," Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report Supplement (Far East), No. 171(45), 3 Sep 1965, p. 24.

³Ibid., p. 25.

HISTORY OF CHINESE INTEREST IN LATIN AMERICA

Latin America has been a target for Communist conquest since the early 1920's when the Third Communist International (Comintern) initiated a program to organize and coordinate Communist political and organizational activities in Central and South American nations.⁴ Comintern agents, operating under orders from Moscow, were active during this early period in recruiting and training Latin American party leaders.⁵ By 1926, the First Conference of Latin American Communist Parties was held in Buenos Aires, drawing delegates from 14 of the 20 Latin American nations.⁶ From this nucleus, the Communist movement in Latin America grew rapidly in the 1930's and 40's, with the global depression spurring Communist organizational efforts among workers. When World War II ended, the Latin American Communist movement was flourishing and its party organization operated openly in virtually every country in the hemisphere. Communist-controlled labor unions and hemisphere-wide labor associations served as centers of expanding party operations throughout the area. Moscow's control over party activities throughout Latin America was complete and thorough, acting through centralized command posts in Uruguay, Mexico and Cuba.⁷

⁴US Congress, House, Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, Foreign Affairs Committee, Castro Communist Subversion in the Western Hemisphere, 14 March 1963, p. 1.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Ibid.

⁷Ibid., p. 2.

Long before China became a Communist nation, thousands of Chinese entered Latin America as immigrants or slaves. It was estimated that there were 80,000 Chinese in Cuba in 1926,⁸ who had been imported as slaves during the earlier Spanish colonial period. There are large Chinese colonies in other Latin American countries, such as Peru and Venezuela, which have been there for many years.⁹

There are some indications that the Chinese Communists had influence or were active in Latin American politics before their victory in China in 1949. For example, Eudocio Ravines¹⁰ gives the Chinese Communists credit for inspiring the popular front tactics he introduced into Chile in the mid-1930's.¹¹ The chairman of the Chinese Communist Party in Cuba, Lin Fo-chu, arrived in Cuba with a group of Chinese Communists in the early thirties.¹² They formed the first Chicom party cell between 1940 and 1943, in Manzanillo in Oriente Province, the hometown of Blas Roca.¹³ Between 1943 and 1946, other Chinese Communist cells were formed in Guantanamo, Santiago de Cuba, Cienfuegos and Havana. The total number of Chinese Communists in Cuba at this time was estimated to be 80 to 90.¹⁴

⁸US Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Red Chinese Infiltration into Latin America, 4 August 1965, p. 33.

⁹Ibid., pp. 3 and 17.

¹⁰Eudocio Ravines, a Peruvian, sent by the Comintern to Chile in 1935 as a head of a group to adopt the new policy of the popular front. Rollie Poppino, International Communism in Latin America, p. 145.

¹¹Ibid., p. 174.

¹²Senate Judiciary Committee, op. cit., pp. 33 and 38.

¹³Ibid., p. 33. (Blas Roca, a pseudonym for Francisco Calderio, is Secretary General of the Cuban Communist Party.)

¹⁴Ibid.

As early as 1947, Comrade Mao Tse-tung pointed out that, "the Latin American peoples are not the obedient slaves of US imperialism."¹⁵ At this time too, some local Latin American observers, either in response to Peking's appeal, or independently, saw "a certain parallelism between the sociological conditions prevailing in China and in Latin America."¹⁶ On this basis a search for, and discovery of, a "mutuality" by sympathetic elements took place on both sides.¹⁷

Chinese interest and activities in Latin America increased sharply in the early 1950's. The Chinese Communists infiltrated the Communist Party in Bolivia in 1950, perhaps because Russia paid less attention to that country, and also because of the relatively inexpensive operations there.¹⁸ The agrarian reform in Bolivia was based almost entirely on Red Chinese plans and the Red Chinese agrarian reform was used as a basis for Bolivia's.¹⁹ In 1952, Peking began commercial negotiations with Argentina in Moscow. The present trade between these two countries began two years later after an Argentine trade and industrial mission visited

¹⁵Foreign Languages Press, "Support the Cuban and Other Latin American Peoples' Just Struggle Against US Imperialism," p. 95.

¹⁶Salvador de Madariaga, Latin America Between the Eagle and the Bear, p. 163.

¹⁷Sen-Yu Dai. "Peking and the 'Third World'," Current History, Vol. 49, No. 289, Sep 1965, pp. 147-148.

¹⁸Senate Judiciary Committee, op. cit., p. 21.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 16.

Peking and signed a contract with Red China, which provided for the export of 20,000 tons of Argentine wheat to China.²⁰ During the Korean War, a few Latin American Communists visited China while on tour of the Communist camp. By the mid-1950's visits to Peking and Shanghai had become a regular feature of such tours for a growing number of Latin American travelers.²¹ "Peace-conscious" groups went from all 11 Latin American states bordering on the Pacific to attend the Peace Conference of the Asian and Pacific Regions in Peking in 1952, after which a permanent liaison committee was established to include one or more members from all these countries to carry out "peace" work on a coordinated basis on both sides of the Pacific.²²

Chinese "people's diplomacy" started to play a positive role in Latin America from 1956 onwards.²³ Trade with Brazil and Uruguay commenced, with China agreeing to buy cotton, sugar and wool; some of it at premium prices.²⁴ In 1956, over 50 delegates from Communist parties in 11 Latin American countries attended the eighth National Congress of the Chinese Communist party in Peking, where Mao Tse-tung pronounced his determination to give "active support to the national independence and liberation movement in countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America."²⁵ Starting in 1956 non-Communist members of Latin

²⁰Ibid., p. 45. (Translation from the Venezuelan publication "Este y Oeste," 15-30 Jun 1965.)

²¹Poppino, op. cit., p. 174.

²²Shen-Yu Dai, op. cit., p. 148.

²³Ibid.

²⁴Senate Judiciary Committee, op. cit., p. 43. (Translation from the Venezuelan publication "Este y Oeste," 15-30 Jun 1965.)

²⁵Shen-Yu Dai, op. cit., p. 148.

American front groups comprised a significant percentage of all Latin Americans traveling to Communist China, and by 1959 non-Communist intellectuals, journalists, publishers, congressmen and business and labor leaders far outnumbered Communists among the 400 Latin American visitors to Peking.²⁶ In 1957, Spanish language shortwave broadcasts were initiated by Radio Peking,²⁷ and were beamed toward an ever expanding group of Latin American listeners. All this eventually culminated in the establishment of formal diplomatic relations with revolutionized Cuba in 1960. By this time, surprisingly, Peking had established informal contacts and non-diplomatic relations not only with all 20 republics south of the Rio Grande, but also with 3 other territories in the Caribbean area--the French Martinique, the French Guadeloupe and Dutch Guiana, plus Puerto Rico.²⁸

PURPOSE

With the stage thus set, revealing Latin America as an important element of overall Chinese strategy, and presenting a history of increasing Chinese emphasis toward the area, this paper seeks to define the specific Chinese regional strategy. It was apparent from the extensive research that preceded this writing that no unclassified Western source deals specifically with this subject. There are many works dealing with so-called communism, international communism or

²⁶Poppino, op. cit., p. 176.

²⁷Ibid.

²⁸Shen-Yu Dai, op. cit., p. 148.

Castro communism in Latin America. Some of these seek to outline strategies, but none of them try to isolate the Chinese role. The US Senate Committee on the Judiciary held interesting hearings in 1965 on the general subject of Red Chinese infiltration into Latin America, but did not attempt to conclude a specific strategy. The Asian People's Anti-Communist League of the Republic of China has published considerable material on Red China's world-wide activities, that comes as close to the goals of this paper as anything the author encountered. Even the vociferous Chinese Communists themselves are vague and general in regard to their regional strategies.

It is the author's contention; however, that the Red Chinese do have a specific national strategy to guide their activities in Latin America. This strategy can be induced fairly accurately from a careful analysis of the known facts; and firmly supported, if not proven, by the countless indications that are apparent in everyday occurrences and utterances.

The methodology undertaken in this regard is to first examine the Latin American arena, in order to identify major military, political, socio-psychological and economic factors which might assist in determining Chinese Communist regional objectives. Next, the Communist movement in Latin America will be carefully scrutinized, giving particular attention to the roles of International Communism and Castro's Cuba, and to the manifestations of the Sino-Soviet dispute. This examination

should produce enough evidence from which to conclude tentative broad objectives of the Chinese regional strategy. These possible objectives will be analyzed in the light of known Chinese capabilities, in order to further identify logical courses of action which might be employed in their implementation. After testing these concepts in the crucible of current indications in Latin America, it can be reasonably concluded that a probable Chinese national strategy for the region has been isolated.

CHAPTER 2

THE LATIN AMERICAN ARENA

GENERAL

Latin America offers conditions which greatly tempt the Communists. It is an area of transition, facing a myriad of problems in attempting rapidly to raise the standards of living and productivity of its people; profound changes are occurring in its political and social structure; its population is growing more rapidly than any other area; and widespread dissatisfaction with existing conditions and an urge to reform are the order of the day.¹ Inevitably, this process of change--although ultimately leading toward the goals of greater freedom and a higher standard of living for the individual--temporarily brings frictions, frustrations and maladjustments which the Communists seek to exacerbate and use to their advantage. Like the skilled judo fighter, they cleverly seek to use the points of weakness to make the area's strength work against itself.²

¹R. R. Rubottom, "International Communism in Latin America," Department of State Publication, No. 7048, Inter-American Series 60, Aug 1960, pp. 4-5.

²Ibid., p. 5.

MILITARY FACTORS

The greatest attraction of Latin America to the Communists is its strategic location.³ From the Chinese point of view, Lin Piao expressed it this way:

Comrade Mao Tse-tung's theory of the establishment of rural revolutionary base areas and the encirclement of the cities from the countryside is of outstanding and universal practical importance. . . . Taking the entire globe, if North America and Western Europe can be called the 'cities of the world' then Asia, Africa and Latin America constitute 'the rural areas of the world.'⁴

Not only is the region strategically located on the south and southeastern flank of North America, but also it controls vital world sea and air lanes. Near the center of the region is the Panama Canal, through which flows the wealth of nations and the inter-ocean commerce of the world. Across the Caribbean criss-cross important world trade routes, both by sea and by air,⁵ and only 1920 statute miles separate Dakar in Africa from Natal in Brazil.

The indigenous armed forces are another likely target of the Communists in Latin America.⁶ Traditionally, the military of the

³"The significance of the problem in Latin America becomes evident. . . because of her proximity to the principal Western potential defense center," Enrique Martinez Cadó, "Communist Revolutionary War in Latin America," Military Review, Vol XLIII, No. 8, Aug 1963, p. 4.

⁴Lin Piao, "Long Live the Victory of the People's War," Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report Supplement (Far East), No. 171(45), 3 Sep 1965, p. 22.

⁵"Venezuela is strategically located to serve as a base for the spread of Communist subversion," Jeanne Kuebler, Venezuela, Target for the Reds, p. 190.

⁶"Successful efforts to take over any nation would first require the neutralization or subversion of the armed forces of that country," Joseph F. Carroll, testifying before House, Sub-committee on Inter-American Affairs, Foreign Affairs Committee, Castro Communist Subversion in the Western Hemisphere, Feb-Mar 1963, p. 153.

region have spawned the dictators and supported them. In this role, they are widely considered as despotic forces of reaction among rising liberals in Latin America.⁷ On the other hand, actual Communist penetration of the armed forces has been negligible, and the military considers itself the traditional protector of the constitutional system.⁸ In the actual cases of the ouster of Peron in Argentina, Perez-Jimenez in Venezuela, and Rojas Pinilla in Columbia, it was the military who overthrew the dictator and eventually restored democratic governments.⁹ Therefore, the Communists may seek to exploit the military in several ways toward their own ends. On one hand, they may depict the military as the tool of reaction, fascism or imperialism, in order to weaken them in the eyes of the liberals. On the other, they may provoke the military to overthrow a regime not of their liking, thus creating the opportunity for Communist inroads into a succeeding government.

Since "Peoples' Wars" and "Wars of National Liberation" can be most economically fought by non-communists, the Communists probably rationalize winning such wars without becoming directly involved. The war in Vietnam is a case in point. Their military role in these

⁷"There was even a possibility of a military coup in Uruguay, which has never been seriously menaced by Communist activity." Stanley Ross, testifying before US Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Red Chinese Infiltration into Latin America, 4 Aug 1965, p. 21.

⁸Joseph F. Carroll, op. cit., p. 152.

⁹Adolf A. Berle, Jr., "The Cold War in Latin America," The Brien McMahon Lectures, 21 Oct 1961, pp. 12-13.

situations would be the development of anti-government forces through guerrilla training,¹⁰ and the provision of arms and materiel.

The final military factors that warrant consideration are the collective security system of the Organization of American States, and the United States forces and bases in the region. Of the former, through the Inter-American Defense Board, a collective security system is prepared to meet the possibility of open military aggression by Communist forces against nations in the hemisphere.¹¹ However, no plan for collective action against Communist subversive aggression has been put into effect,¹² and the Communists would profit by blocking such an arrangement.¹³ Principal US military bases in Latin America are at Guantanamo in Cuba, the Canal Zone in Panama, and in Puerto Rico, all of which recently have been active targets of propaganda and subversion. There is also throughout the region a system of US MAAG's and Missions, evolved through bi-lateral agreements, which provide advice, training and materiel to strengthen Latin American armed forces. These elements also may be listed as targets for the Reds.

¹⁰Carroll, op. cit., p. 152.

¹¹US Congress, House, Sub-committee on Inter-American Affairs, Foreign Affairs Committee, Castro Communist Subversion in the Western Hemisphere, 14 Mar 1963, p. 5.

¹²Ibid.

¹³US proposals for such an arrangement were not favorably received at the OAS conference in Rio de Janerio in November 1965.

POLITICAL FACTORS

As "nationalism" has spread in the modern world, Latin America has caught the infection. Generally, the growing nationalism of Latin America has taken the form of a desire to be "free" from real or alleged subservience to certain of the Great Powers.¹⁴ There is virtually no nation in the region that does not have strong nationalistic tendencies, if not an active nationalist movement, usually far removed from the aims and goals of Communism. However, the Communists have consistently attempted to use the explosive energies of nationalism toward their own ends. They have striven especially hard to portray themselves as ardent nationalists of the particular countries in which they are operating.¹⁵

Latin American nationalism has been largely "anti-imperialism." Some of this feeling is directed against France, Britain and the Netherlands, who still hold colonial territories in the region. But in the main, anti-imperialist sentiments are directed against the United States. That many Latin Americans have continued to feel aggrieved by past US policies is understandable, and anyone carefully and honestly weighing available facts cannot but conclude that many historic "Yankee" actions fitted under one of several definitions of "imperialism."¹⁶ Unfortunately, throughout the world imperialism has become, without much Communist urging, the usual description of

¹⁴Robert J. Alexander, Communism in Latin America, p. 6.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 9.

¹⁶Thomas W. Palmer, Jr., Search for a Latin American Policy, p. 46.

past American policies in the Western Hemisphere. The Guatemalan episode in 1954 tended to reinvigorate such thinking,¹⁷ and more recently the United States intervention in the Dominican Republic. But the Communists, of course, have embraced "anti-imperialism" with a vengeance,¹⁸ and violently oppose United States influence in Latin America. Campaigns "for peace" and "against Yanqui imperialism" have become the principal preoccupation of Latin American Communists.

The desire on the part of the masses of people of Latin America for greater participation in the affairs of their government, and for the fundamental freedoms associated with political democracy, is profound indeed.¹⁹ This trend is reflected in the growth of legitimate constitutional governments in the region from seven to eleven within the last decade.²⁰ However, the great danger in the Latin American revolution has been that it might be diverted from democratic channels; that democracy might be sacrificed to achieve other objectives of revolution.²¹ The Communists have consistently sought--through using democratic slogans--to direct the revolution into courses which would result in the establishment of their own particular brand of totalitarianism.²²

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸Alexander, op. cit., p. 9.

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰Roland M. Schneider, "The U.S. in Latin America," Current History, Vol. 48, No. 281, Jan 1965, p. 3.

²¹"For the landless peasants they (the Communists) charge that democracy is nothing more than a political tool used by rich land-owners to further exploit the peasants," Carroll, op. cit., p. 150.

²²Alexander, op. cit., p. 9.

Dictatorship is another political phenomenon exploitable by the Communists. It is interesting to note that dictators, supported by the Communists, did rule much of Latin America during the forties and fifties; Vargas in Brazil, Perón in Argentina, Pérez Jimenez in Venezuela, Rojas Pinilla in Columbia, Odria in Peru and Batista in Cuba. All came to the end of the road, and their end was always accompanied by disorder--giving the Communists their opportunity.²³ Dictators always attempt to destroy their enemies--usually those who believe in democracy. The Communists consider these democratic leaders enemies also, and are glad to see the dictators do the dirty work.²⁴

Ancient border problems persist throughout Latin America. These disputes are inflammatory far beyond their actual importance. Minor boundary problems and international jealousies and prejudices are emotionally over-played by Latins; and this emotionalism tends to cause disequilibria on more important problems, such as inter-regional commerce and Pan-Americanism.²⁵ The results of these squabbles, even when not agitated by the Communists, usually work to the disadvantage of hemispheric peace and security.

²³See Poppino, op. cit., p. 39.

²⁴Berle, op. cit., p. 12.

²⁵In November 1965, Venezuela declined to attend the Rio de Janerio Conference of the OAS, because Brazil was governed by a military regime, in violation of Venezuelan political principles.

SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS

Communism breeds on discontent. Discontent is the historical background for the Communist movement in Latin America. Conditions of life in most of the countries south of the Rio Grande are still backward, poor and, in many cases, oppressive. Yet this pattern is changing, and changing rapidly.²⁶ For several decades, there has been increasing discontent with traditional conditions, born from increasing awareness by Latin Americans of their relative lack of progress in a progressive world. It is the dissatisfaction with the "status quo" upon which Communism feeds. Every grievance is exploited--and there are many in Latin America. The grievance is desired by the Communist--not the solution.²⁷

Where Indians make up the great mass of agricultural tenants and peons, there has been a struggle, ever since the Spanish conquest, between white or mestizo landlords and Indian agricultural communities; a battle in which the Indians have generally been the losers.²⁸ This basic racial antagonism persists in much of Latin America, although racial mixtures of white and Indian (mestizo) and white and negro (mulatto) is the rule rather than the exception; therefore, color is a lesser factor.²⁹ Color is an important

²⁶Alexander, op. cit., p. 3.

²⁷Berle, op. cit., p. 11.

²⁸Alexander, op. cit., p. 3.

²⁹"The Kremlin believed that all Latin Americans were Indians, and, like the Chinese, could be incited to racial hatred against the United States," Spruille Braden, Syllabus on the Communist Threat in the Americas, p. 2.

element, however, in the current dream of Red China to become the leader of the colored peoples of the world. The Chinese Communists will continue to capitalize on racial affinity to try to win over Asian, African, and Latin American countries.³⁰

The population explosion is introducing other stresses into Latin America. For example, the non-white population is experiencing the greatest increase, becoming more important in relation to the white.³¹ Population growth has been estimated at over 2.5 per cent for the region as a whole, but reaches as high as 3.5 per cent in a few countries, and drops below 1.5 per cent in others.³² This rapid rate of growth in an area potentially able to support many millions more can hardly be overlooked as a growing element of power by the Communists. The lower growth rate of the United States tends to increase substantially Latin America's relative importance in world affairs, for forty years from now its manpower may exceed that of the United States by twofold.³³

Everywhere in Latin America, intellectuals and students, in so far as they engage in politics, are identified with the forces struggling for change.³⁴ The vast majority of the politically active

³⁰Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League, Chinese Communist Expansion and Rivalry with the Soviet Union in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, p. 64.

³¹Gary MacEoin, Latin America--The Eleventh Hour, pp. 11-12.

³²Karl M. Schmitt and David D. Burks, Evolution or Chaos, p. 109.

³³MacEoin, op. cit., p. 12.

³⁴"The university student, traditionally a very influential figure in Latin America, is urged to look at his current position, the instability of democratic government and institutions in Latin America, and the difficulty he will have in securing useful employment under prevailing economic conditions," Carroll, op. cit., pp. 150-151.

students and intellectuals have been nurtured on a nationalist creed, reinforced by Marxism,³⁵ in their approach to the solution of Latin American ills.³⁶ Their facile use of Marxist terminology; their hostility to private business enterprise; their aversion to "imperialism" and "colonialism"; their indorsement of the concept of class conflict, and their advocacy of broad and deep government control over social and economic life of the nation, attest to this intellectual formation.³⁷ Most of these people are not Communists, but many are willing to work with the Communists toward the achievement of supposedly identical goals.³⁸

The large number of overseas Chinese living in the Latin American region has already been mentioned. Herein is a ready-made reservoir of native Chinese talent, who have been thoroughly integrated into local society, with many occupying positions of influence and trust within their respective communities. Conveniently for the Communists who may seek to exploit them, "many scores of thousands"³⁹ of these overseas Chinese are currently living in the critical Caribbean area. Even though these emigrants seek only to conduct ethical business, and live normal, peaceful lives, their inevitable ties to the mainland of China make them particularly susceptible to manipulation by the Chinese Communists.

³⁵Schmitt and Burks, op. cit., p. 132.

³⁶Poppino, op. cit., p. 40.

³⁷Schmitt and Burks, op. cit., p. 133.

³⁸Ibid., p. 134.

³⁹Senate Judiciary Committee, op. cit., p. 12. (Extracted from an article by Victor Riesel, entitled, "Inside Labor," published by the Hall Syndicate, Inc., New York, 29 July 1965.)

ECONOMIC FACTORS

"Communism is not an economic disease. It poisons the mind before it enters the stomach."

Dr. Manuel A. de Varona
Former President of the Cuban Senate

The vast natural resources of the Latin American region would appear to be a logical Communist objective, both from the standpoint of a source of materials to them, and denial of a source to the "imperialists." Control of Venezuela, which is the world's third largest producer and largest exporter of petroleum, would add immeasurably to the Communist ability to disrupt world oil markets.⁴⁰ Brazil has the world's biggest iron ore deposits, plus manganese, uranium and other important minerals.⁴¹ Bolivia is rich in tin, and Chila in copper. Then there are important food products and staples, such as coffee in Brazil and Columbia, wool in Uruguay, tropical fruit in Brazil and Central America, cotton in Mexico and, most important to the grain-hungry Chinese, wheat in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico.

Latin America is still a predominately agricultural region, in spite of tremendous strides toward industrialization. In many regions agriculture has been truly fuedal in its land holding patterns.⁴²

⁴⁰Kuebler, op. cit., p. 190.

⁴¹"If Brazil Fails to Make it This time," U.S. News and World Report, 11 Oct 1965, p. 84.

⁴²Alexander, op. cit., p. 3.

In the relationship between the man and the land, the dominating pattern is that of ownership of immense tracts of territory--the "latifundios"--by a small group of landowners. Most of the balance of Latin America's arable land is in the form of "minifundios," or dwarf holdings, which are just as unsatisfactory humanly and economically as the vast "latifundios."⁴³ The first consequence of this tenure system is that an overwhelming majority of the peasants are directly or indirectly employed by their landowners--if they are not virtually owned by them. The second consequence is that these land empires are not utilized with long run effects in mind, because the landlord, as a rule, is interested only in the profit-making cash crops, primarily for export.⁴⁴ The realization of large profits by capitalist landowners, in contrast to the poverty of the masses of land-hungry peasants, creates a classic situation for the exploitation of Communist ideology.

Economic development itself is generating pressures which increase prevailing tensions.⁴⁵ For example, rapid urbanization is creating crowded, fetid city slums, with wretched housing and sanitary conditions. These slums contrast sharply with the relative prosperity of the burgeoning Latin American cities. This population shift to the urban sector, and the effects of mechanization, produce

⁴³Tad Szulc, The Winds of Revolution, p. 54.

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 55.

⁴⁵Thomas F. Carroll, "Land Reform as an Explosive Force in Latin America," Explosive Forces in Latin America, ed. John J. TePashe and Sydney N. Fisher, p. 101.

widespread unemployment in some areas, while industrialization in smaller towns is causing labor shortages elsewhere.⁴⁶ Better communications and greater mobility for the people have brought the rural masses into more intimate contact with the developed parts of their countries and with the outside world. Progress is being made, but the danger is that the slow rate of change is likely to lead to the release of explosive, rather than creative, forces.⁴⁷

In early 1961, President Kennedy called for an "Alliance for Progress" to ward off the threatening revolutions in Latin America. In a bold plan for social rehabilitation and economic growth, he pledged aid from various sources, totaling \$20 billion dollars over a ten year period, in return for massive internal investments and reforms within Latin America.⁴⁸ The program was officially launched with the signing of the Charter of Punta del Este, Uruguay, in August 1961.⁴⁹ The alliance has encountered many problems in its initial phases, but the program also has its strengths.⁵⁰ Many countries have lagged behind in preparing programs for economic and social reforms called for by the Alliance for Progress.⁵¹ On the other hand, in Mexico, Chile, Costa Rica, Peru, and Venezuela, there has been a sincere effort to attain the goals of economic stability, political unity, and social reforms that were agreed upon unanimously at

⁴⁶Ibid.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 102.

⁴⁸Schmitt and Burks, op. cit., p. 4.

⁴⁹Ibid.

⁵⁰George I. Blankstein, "Alliance for Progress," Explosive Forces in Latin America, ed. John J. TePashe and Sidney N. Fisher, p. 179.

⁵¹John Donovan, Red Machete, p. 307.

Punta del Este.⁵² Therefore, we can be assured that the Communists are alert to this long-range collective plan for economic, social, and political stabilization, and will attack it at every quarter.⁵³

⁵²"Communist Exploit Latin American Instability," Communist Affairs, Vol. 3, No. 4, July-August 1965, p. 10.

⁵³"The Communists have violently opposed the Alliance for Progress and have branded it the 'Alliance for Misery,'" Jules Dubois, Operation America, p. 307.

CHAPTER 3

COMMUNISM IN LATIN AMERICA

"Communism is neither a social doctrine or a political party, but an international conspiracy designed to use the franchise of democracy in order to destroy democracy."

Dr. Manuel A. de Varona
Former President of the Cuban Senate

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM

There could be no greater mistake than to believe that the Communists of Latin America are somehow "different," that because they are Latin American they do not share the characteristics of Communists in other parts of the world.¹ We have already seen in Chapter 1 how Communism commenced in Latin America in the early 1920's and flourished through World War II. Then as now, Latin American Communists have never been without direction from the Communist International.²

The Communist Party

The Communist parties of Latin America claim to be the vanguard of the proletariat. Their primary purpose, in the Communist view, is to awaken political consciousness in the proletariat, to inspire it to political action, and to lead it to political power. The Communists maintain incessantly that only they understand and care

¹Robert J. Alexander, Communism in Latin America, p. 32.

²Ibid.

about the grievances of the lower class, or are capable of forming a government that will satisfy these grievances.³

Disciplined organization is the greatest asset of the Latin American Communist parties. It has permitted them to survive long periods of repression, to operate underground or in the open, and to contract or expand rapidly as circumstances dictate. Throughout Latin America the Communist parties all have the same basic structure patterned closely after that of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.⁴ The party structure may be described as a pyramid in which the national leadership forms the apex and local units, or cells, make up the broad base.⁵

The principal leadership of the Communist parties of Latin America has come from the intellectuals and the labor unions. That the Communists should draw many of their principal figures from the intelligentsia is not surprising.⁶ This group is less tradition bound, has more time on its hands, and considerable guilt in its heart for the plight of the people.

The leadership of the Communist parties in Latin America has come to form a compact, highly indoctrinated group, subject to the discipline of the International. It is a core of professional revolutionaries, who spend virtually all of their waking hours on party business. This leadership is well financed and extremely

³Rollie Poppino, International Communism in Latin America, p. 97.

⁴Ibid., p. 117.

⁵Ibid., p. 118.

⁶Alexander, op. cit., p. 71.

active. It has developed a tactical subtlety which a less Machiavellian type of political movement would find impossible to achieve.⁷

Labor Movement

From the earliest days the Communists have directed much of their energy and attention toward the penetration and control of the labor movement. They have done so for two reasons: to attract working class members into the party, and because of their conviction that control of organized labor is a necessary first step to eventual acquisition of political power.⁸ Through trade union activities, the Communists were often able to win the confidence of the workers, first in economic matters, and eventually in political affairs as well.⁹ When they have a foothold at the trade union level, the Communists try to extend their control to all organized workers in the nation. They have played an active role in forming federations in related crafts and industries. Once two or more federations have been established, they usually urge the consolidation of all federations into a single unified national labor body.¹⁰

Student Movement

The pattern of Communist tactics and techniques employed in labor is repeated with only slight variation among Latin American student and youth organizations.¹¹ In these areas, the Communists

⁷Ibid., p. 79.

⁸Poppino, op. cit., p. 130.

⁹Alexander, op. cit., p. 69.

¹⁰Poppino, op. cit., p. 130.

¹¹Ibid., p. 132.

are prone to operate more openly, even in nations where the party is outlawed. Material support from local and international sources gives the Communists considerable advantage over young leaders from other political parties. The student effort is concentrated largely at the university level, but some attempts are made to seize secondary level student organizations, and urban and rural youth groups. The Communists seek to infiltrate and win converts in all such groups, to obtain direct or indirect control over key offices, to create or capture the national organization of each separate youth and student association, and then draw all of these into a broad national body under Communist domination and influence.¹²

Propaganda

The effectiveness of Communist tactics and propaganda in Latin America depends largely on the existence of a wide range of interlocking front groups that supplement and draw upon the Communist-led mass organizations.¹³ Therefore, they always attempt to penetrate and manipulate cultural and friendship associations, ethnic groups, women's organizations, professional societies and other special interest groups, employing specific appeals to each. Usually the special interest fronts emphasize some legitimate need or particular aspiration, but they are soon influenced to extend their activities into the arena of political propaganda.

¹²Ibid.

¹³Ibid., p. 133.

The Communists also maintain a constantly changing array of contrived front groups, each ostensibly non-political and created to support a particular propaganda theme or an objective of the local party or international movement.¹⁴ This continuing proliferation of front organizations is a characteristic of the Communist movement throughout Latin America. It is a technique consciously employed to create the impression of widespread, spontaneous and growing enthusiasm for the issues and objectives propounded by the local Communist party.¹⁵

The Communists also attempt to place secret agents in institutions which influence public and official attitudes. Primary targets are the government, the military, mass communications media, the educational system, and other political parties. Every country in Latin America has at least a few hidden Communists in these sectors.¹⁶

Propaganda is a vicious tool of Communists everywhere, and it is particularly useful among the excitable Latins. This propaganda includes not only huge amounts being published and disseminated within Latin America, but also large amounts imported from the Communist Bloc. In 1960 it was estimated that it would take \$100 million dollars annually to finance a propaganda effort of the scope which the Communists carry out in Latin America.¹⁷

¹⁴Ibid., p. 133.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 135.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 137.

¹⁷R. R. Rubottom, "International Communism in Latin America," Department of State Publication 7048, Inter-American Series 60, p. 9.

Strategy

Since the mid-1950's, the Communists have maintained a modified popular front strategy. Without abandoning their opportunistic tactics, they seek to cooperate as equals with all center and leftist "progressive" parties in a "democratic front of national liberation." In their public pronouncements, they have stressed their intention to gain their objectives by "peaceful" means, and have generally renounced the use of force as a political weapon. Yet they have been involved in revolutionary adventure in practically every Latin American country. Once a decision is made to resort to force, the party usually attaches itself to revolutions launched by other political groups. The success of the Cuban Communist Party in exploiting the Castro revolution has led Communists in other parts of Latin America to adopt a somewhat more assertive attitude,¹⁸ but they continue to emphasize the need for a multi-party front.¹⁹

THE CUBAN REVOLUTION AND THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE

General

The creation of a "Socialist Republic" in Cuba, and the emergence of the People's Republic of China as a major Communist power,

¹⁸"The Communists have moved away from the policy of collaborating with other non-Communist groups and are now emphasizing to a greater extent the hitherto revolutionary approach, which constitutes a direct threat to other Latin American governments," Ibid.

¹⁹Poppino, op. cit., p. 140.

have generated new thrusts to the Latin American Communist movement. Before much can be accomplished in hypothesizing the Chinese strategy in the region, it is necessary to examine these phenomena in some detail.

During most of 1959 the Soviet Union did little to support Castro's Cuba, although they welcomed the leftward shift of his policies.²⁰ However, subsequent Soviet recognition²¹ and massive aid to the Castro regime gave the Communists hope for sweeping victories throughout Latin America.²² When it became apparent to Castro that his very existence was completely dependent on Soviet cooperation and goodwill, he grudgingly acknowledged the validity of the Soviet concept of "peaceful transition to socialism,"²³ but his personal experiences and emotions inclined him strongly toward the Chinese position on the use of violence.²⁴

The Cuban revolution was a boon to the Chinese Communists. It provided them with excellent ammunition for both the emerging dispute with the Soviet Union and their propaganda offensive against the United States in Latin America and elsewhere.²⁵ Castro's views on

²⁰David D. Burks, "Soviet Policy for Castro's Cuba," Explosive Forces in Latin America, ed. John J. TePashe and Sydney H. Fisher, pp. 3-4.

²¹In May 1960, Ibid., p. 4.

²²Poppino, op. cit., p. 173.

²³"Communist Cuba's dependence on the Soviet Union is complete," US Congress, House, Sub-committee on Inter-American Affairs, Foreign Affairs Committee, Castro-Communist Subversion in the Western Hemisphere, 14 Mar 1963, p. 6.

²⁴Poppino, op. cit., p. 188.

²⁵Ibid., p. 177.

what was good for socialism and revolution in Latin America were more in line with the Chinese Communists than with the Soviets.²⁶ The Cuban action, depicted as an exercise of national sovereignty in defiance of the United States, not only marked a major success in the Chinese Communist quest for respectability, but also enhanced their appeal among ultra-nationalists throughout Latin America.²⁷ Thus Cuba, under the flamboyant Castro, became the center of Soviet and Chinese Communist activities in Latin America.²⁸

Cuba's Role

From its inception, the Castro regime sought to export revolution to other countries of the hemisphere. Direct military effort in 1959 in the form of small rebel force landings in Nicaragua, Panama, the Dominican Republic and Haiti failed.²⁹ Che Guevara, Castro's Industry Minister, admitted that guerrillas in Venezuela, Guatemala, Paraguay, and Columbia were active in armed struggle, and that other guerrilla groups were fomenting clashes in Nicaragua and Peru.³⁰ Venezuela became the primary target for Cuban-based Communist subversive aggression,³¹ and in November 1963 a large cache of arms

²⁶John A. McCone, testifying before the House, Sub-committee on Inter-American Affairs, Foreign Affairs Committee, Castro Communist Subversion in the Western Hemisphere, Feb-Mar 1963, p. 68.

²⁷Poppino, op. cit., p. 177.

²⁸Asian People's Anti-Communist League, Latin America's Red Peril, p. 21.

²⁹House, Sub-committee on Inter-American Affairs, Foreign Affairs Committee, 14 Mar 1963, op. cit., p. 2.

³⁰"Castro Communists Move South," U.S. News and World Report, Vol. XLIX, 12 Dec 1960, p. 51.

³¹House, Sub-committee on Inter-American Affairs, Foreign Affairs Committee, 14 Mar 1963, op. cit., p. 7.

smuggled from Cuba was discovered there.³² After a series of important reverses for Castro and the Communists in 1964, such as the elections of Leoni in Venezuela and Frei in Chile, the overthrow of Goulart in Brazil, and the defeat of Jagan in British Guiana, the ability of the Cuban regime to promote subversion declined considerable.³³ Many observers feel that this decline is only temporary, and that an even more agitated campaign of Cuban directed insurrection, rebellion, and sabotage is in the offing.³⁴

Much evidence exists that Cuba also has become an important Communist base for training and infiltration. Top US intelligence officials established that from 1000 to 1500 Latin Americans traveled to Cuba in 1962 for ideological and paramilitary training, and a greater number in 1963.³⁵ Some graduates of such Cuban training returned to their homeland to foment disorder and chaos aimed at the ultimate overthrow of legitimate democratic governments. Others remained behind to receive more intensive training, and to form the nucleus of military units, which can be returned to their homelands at the appropriate time to lead a "liberation army."³⁶ Cuba also

³²"We know arms have been smuggled from Cuba into Venezuela and we have reports they are being smuggled into other places," Alva R. Fitch, testifying before, House, Sub-committee on Inter-American Affairs, Foreign Affairs Committee, op. cit., Feb-Mar 1965, p. 24.

³³John H. Crummings testifying before, House, Sub-committee on Inter-American Affairs, Foreign Affairs Committee, op. cit., Feb-Mar 1965, p. 4.

³⁴Stanley Ross, testifying before the Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Red Chinese Infiltration into Latin America, 4 Aug 1965 p. 22.

³⁵House, Sub-committee on Inter-American Affairs, Foreign Affairs Committee, 14 Mar 1963, op. cit., p. 3.

³⁶Ibid.

has served as a focal point for the influx of students from all over Latin America. Much student time is devoted to indoctrination sessions that are designed to make them into effective propagandists for the Communist cause.³⁷

A major increase in the Chinese Communist propaganda effort in Latin America coincided with the success of the Cuban revolution. The intensified propaganda effort and additional services provided by the Chinese were of immediate and primary benefit to the Communist parties and front groups.³⁸ The early propaganda treatment of the Cuban revolution also exposed the growing divergence between Chinese and Soviet counsel to the Latin American Communist Parties.³⁹ The principal direct and mass audience medium in Cuba to carry subversive propaganda to Latin America is shortwave radio. The Castro regime inaugurated an international broadcasting service, Radio Havana, on May 1, 1961. This station increased its broadcast time to a total of 266½ hours a week by 1963.⁴⁰ The printed word continues to be carried widely through Tass, the New China News Agency, and Prensa Latina, Cuba's own news service.⁴¹ Tons of Communist literature, featuring anti-government and "hate America" themes, are shipped to entry points throughout the region.⁴²

³⁷John F. Carroll, op. cit., p. 151.

³⁸Poppino, op. cit., p. 176.

³⁹Ibid., p. 178.

⁴⁰House, Sub-committee on Inter-American Affairs, Foreign Affairs Committee, 14 Mar 1963, op. cit., p. 3.

⁴¹US Congress, House, Sub-committee on Inter-American Affairs, Foreign Affairs Committee, Communism in Latin America, 14 Apr 1965, p. 7.

⁴²House, Sub-committee on Inter-American Affairs, Foreign Affairs Committee, 14 Mar 1963, op. cit., p. 3.

Red China's Role in Cuba

On 25 September 1960, the Cuban Cabinet announced that it was establishing diplomatic relations with Communist China at embassy level,⁴³ and thus Cuba became the first, and as yet the only, Latin American country to do so. This diplomatic recognition gave the Chinese the opportunity to staff its new American headquarters with legitimate diplomatic personnel, plus a host of "technicians" and "specialists."⁴⁴ Red Chinese military delegations began arriving in Cuba soon after diplomatic relations were established.⁴⁵ These Red Chinese "specialists" trained Castro's militia in guerrilla tactics. Subversive agents from other Latin American nations were included in these courses. Most of these agents came to Cuba disguised as "students," and were infiltrated back into their countries of origin as such.⁴⁶ Meanwhile, Chinese Communist strength in Cuba increased precipitously through immigration, from a few hundred in 1959 to many thousands in 1965.⁴⁷

The Chinese Communists also sought to align themselves with the Castro regime in the economic field. In December 1959, a trade

⁴³"Communist China Foreign Relations," Deadline Data, 30 Jan 1961, p. 77.

⁴⁴"Cuba has become Red China's headquarters in Latin America. A large Embassy staff and hosts of Chinese technicians and specialists are seen all over Cuba--no doubt many of them are specialists for spreading Communist propaganda in and outside of Cuba," Monde, Paris, 15 May 1961.

⁴⁵Emilio J. Navarro, testifying to the Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, op. cit., p. 49.

⁴⁶Ibid.

⁴⁷Ross, op. cit., p. 53. Estimates 216 Red Chinese in Cuba in 1959 and more than 9000 in 1965.

contract was signed by which the Red Chinese would purchase 50,000 tons of crude sugar from Cuba. In April 1960, another contract was signed calling for Peking's purchase of another 80,000 tons of Cuban sugar.⁴⁸ A Cuban economic mission visited Peking in November 1960 and obtained an economic assistance agreement with Red China. The pact stipulated that China would extend Cuba a loan of 240 million rubles (about \$60,000,000) from 1960 to 1963, without interest, and that it would purchase one million tons of Cuban sugar in 1961.⁴⁹ Other lesser economic agreements were concluded in 1962 and 1963, and in 1965 Cuba and the Chinese announced the signing of a new five-year trade pact that was designed to make "new contributions to the struggle against imperialism headed by the United States." Cuba was to exchange sugar, nickel, and copper concentrates for Chinese rice, oil, tinned meat, paper, cotton fabrics, laminated steel, industrial machinery, and chemical products.⁵⁰ By means of these agreements, the Chinese Communists gained a firm position in the Cuban economy.

The Sino-Soviet Dispute

Because of the tremendous revolutionary potential of the region, Latin America has become a sharp battleground in the Sino-Soviet

⁴⁸Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League, op. cit., p. 8.

⁴⁹Senate Judiciary Committee, op. cit., p. 42. (Translated from Este y Oeste, Caracas, Venezuela, 15-30 Jun 1965.)

⁵⁰Tad Szulc, "Cuba and China Sign Trade Pact," New York Times, 6 Jan 1965, p. 11.

dispute.⁵¹ Furthermore, factional conflicts in Latin America cannot be explained merely in terms of the Sino-Soviet polarization, because Castroism has emerged on the continent as a virtual third force.⁵² In spite of these differences, however, it is folly to believe that any schism or variance between any of the contenders in the Communist camp alters by one iota the basic, overall aim of eventual Communist domination of the world.⁵³ In this ultimate objective, all Communists are agreed and united. Therefore, only the effect on lesser objectives and the means toward their ends warrant further discussion in this paper.

Principally involved in the regional clash between the Chinese Communists and the Soviets is the question of the right strategy to successful conquest of political power. The Chinese frankly prefer the violent path to power, through outright rebellion.⁵⁴ In general, the Soviets appear to favor the slower, "united front" path of alliance with leftist forces; however, their attitude toward the violent path, which involves in most cases the use of a guerrilla movement, is shrouded in ambivalence.⁵⁵

⁵¹Ross, op. cit., p. 20.

⁵²Kevin Devlin, "Boring from Within," Problems of Communism, Vol. XIII, Mar-Apr 1964, p. 29.

⁵³Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League, Chinese Communist Expansion and Rivalry with the Soviet Union in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, p. 64.

⁵⁴"Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun," Mao Tse-tung, "Problems of War and Strategy," Selected Works, Vol. 2, p. 88.

⁵⁵Edwin M. Martin, testifying to the House, Sub-committee on Inter-American Affairs, Foreign Affairs Committee, op. cit., Feb-Mar 1963, p. 10.

Ideologically, this difference has its roots in the basic interpretation of Marxism-Leninism. The Chinese believe in the inevitability of violent revolutions--as they believe in the inevitability of the war against imperialism. The Russians think that the same objective can be achieved by the inevitable, if peaceful, collapse of "capitalistic" regimes.⁵⁶

These varying views have provoked sharp division among the Communist parties of Latin America. Evidence suggests that the older Communist leaders tend to favor the Moscow viewpoint, while the younger, hotter-headed elements find themselves leaning toward the Chinese Communist strategy.⁵⁷ As time brings less and less prospects of success via the "peaceful path," there seems good reason to think that more and more Latin American Communists will incline toward violent overthrow as their only possible means to gain power. This does not necessarily mean capture of the Latin American parties by the Chinese, but there is a coincidence of strategic views between much Latin American dissident Communist thinking and that of the Chinese Communists.⁵⁸

Cuba, we have already seen, is a virtual captive of the major Communist powers, regardless of any separate ideology it may espouse. Although the Cuban revolution comes much closer to the Chinese

⁵⁶Tad Szulc, The Winds of Revolution, p. 188.

⁵⁷"The Chinese Communists, in challenging the Soviets' role as sole and infallible interpreter of Marxism-Leninism, offer their impatient Latin American comrades a new source of leadership and a strategy that is portrayed as particularly suited to Latin American conditions," Poppino, op. cit., p. 173.

⁵⁸Martin, op. cit., p. 10.

recipe,⁵⁹ the Soviet Union, rather than Communist China, still supports Cuba--economically, politically, and militarily.⁶⁰ Without massive Soviet economic aid, it is extremely doubtful that Cuba could long endure,⁶¹ much less export subversion and revolution in any form. As one US diplomat remarked, "his (Castro's) heart is in Peiping but his stomach is in Moscow."⁶² According to another observer, "the Cuban regime has played the Soviet Union against the Chinese, and vice versa, giving lip service to Russia in domestic matters, but taking the Chinese lead in subversion abroad."⁶³ Thus Cuba, at present, not only seeks to serve two masters, but to choose among rival servants in its Latin American subversion.⁶⁴

One more point must be made concerning the Sino-Soviet split before moving on to the development of a Chinese Communist Latin American strategy. This is the matter of the broader issues that tend to set apart the two nations and place them in open world-wide competition. Among vital issues at variance are not only whether or not to follow the "violent path" to revolution, but also disarmament; use of nuclear weapons; policy in Albania, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Pakistan; and leadership in world organizations.⁶⁵

⁵⁹Szulc, op. cit., p. 189.

⁶⁰Finding of the House, Sub-committee for Inter-American Affairs, Foreign Affairs Committee, op. cit., 14 Apr 1965, p. 10.

⁶¹"Without its (Soviet) direct financial support in the form of hundreds of millions of dollars annually, Cuba's economy would be flattened," Ibid.

⁶²Martin, op. cit., p. 10.

⁶³Ross, op. cit., p. 20.

⁶⁴McCone, op. cit., p. 68.

⁶⁵See Wolfgang Leonhard, "A World in Disarray," Problems in Communism, Vol. XIII, Mar-Apr 1964, pp. 16-26.

As a result of these differences, the Chinese propaganda offensive against Moscow has been reinvigorated. In an editorial on 29 January 1965, the New York Times draws this conclusion:

The main thread of policy behind these and other moves is not difficult to discern. Chinese rulers dream of creating and leading an alliance of the "have--not" nations against the "have" nations--an alliance in which the frustrations and resentments of hundreds of millions in Asia, Africa, and Latin America can be mobilized and focused against the nations of Europe and North America. In this dream of a new divided world, the Soviet Union--a relatively prosperous nation inhabited mainly by persons with white skins--is regarded as the enemy along with the United States.⁶⁶

What does all this mean? Simply that the People's Republic of China, on its own and in its own fashion, has "arrived." As far as Peking's general policy is concerned, there is a medium or intermediate goal of major--or "super" power status.⁶⁷ The challenge is to "imperialism" world-wide--and imperialism includes the Soviet "revisionists."

⁶⁶Editorial, New York Times, 29 Jan 1965, p. 28.

⁶⁷Shen-Yu Dai, "Peking and the 'Third World'," Current History, Vol. 49, No. 289, Sep 1965, p. 149.

CHAPTER 4

A PROBABLE CHINESE STRATEGY

GENERAL

A review of the foregoing chapters now reveals sufficient tangible evidence from which a tentative Chinese strategy for Latin America can be postulated. We have already concluded, from the standpoint of history, that Latin America is an area of considerable Chinese interest. In Chapter II, it was noted that the area was strategically important to any US opposed power because of its position on the southeast flank of the North American continent. Furthermore, control of the Panama canal and the vital Atlantic, Pacific, and Caribbean air and sea lanes, the abundance of natural resources, and the potential political power of its burgeoning population makes Latin America a lucrative strategic target for any opponent of "Western imperialism."

NATIONAL OBJECTIVES

There can be little doubt that a virulent and avowed enemy of the United States, such as the People's Republic of China,¹ would covet the opportunity to exert power in such a vital region. As distant from China as it may be, Latin America clearly represents

¹"It is the U.S. imperialists who are brutal and vicious," Chen I, Vice Premier and Foreign Minister, PRC in a press conference on 29 Sep 1965, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report Supplement, No. 197(65), 12 Oct 1965, p. 12.

a fertile field for advancing Communism, and preferably Red China's own brand of Communism. Assuming this to be the case, what might be the objectives of the Chinese Communists in Latin America? Three broad regional objectives can be logically conceived.

First, since the United States is the ultimate enemy, the Red Chinese would want to weaken U.S. influence in Latin America.² In this objective, the Chinese could expect the wholehearted support and cooperation of the Soviet Union, and could employ limited Chinese resources in concert and coordination with the more powerful assets of International Communism.³ The military targets of this objective would be the United States forces and bases in the region, including Guantanamo, Puerto Rico, and the Canal Zone; US MAAG's and Missions throughout Latin America, and the indigenous armed forces that they advise and assist. The political targets would be dictatorships; pro-Western governments; organizational institutions, such as the United Nations, the Organization of American States, and the Pan American Union; and perhaps the establishment of a diplomatic network of embassies and consulates throughout the region. On the socio-psychological front, the widespread activities of the United States

²"The objective is to undermine the traditional American political and economic leadership in Latin America so that the United States would be ultimately isolated," Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League, Latin America's Red Peril, p. 4.

³"The Communists work in unison to bring about political (and) economic upheaval by way of coup d'etats and anti-American activities in Latin America," Enrique Chan testifying to US Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Red Chinese Infiltration into Latin America, 4 Aug 1965, p. 32.

Information Agency lend themselves to attack, as well as the Peace Corps, the U.S. press corps, and religious missionaries. And finally, in the economic field, the Alliance for Progress, U.S. commercial enterprises, the flow of raw materials, and the huge U.S. investment in Latin America all present lucrative targets for Communist inspired cleavages.

A second Chinese objective would probably be to advance Communism in Latin America. This objective could also be accomplished largely in concert with the Soviet Union, and under the auspices of the Comintern. Cuba would probably play an important role in the implementation of this objective as the forward base for Communism in the Western Hemisphere. The great political force of "nationalism" can be the principal political target. This explosive force can be harnessed and manipulated in a myriad of ways to further the ends of Communism from "united front" organizations, through the fanning of the flames of armed insurrection. Students, youth, artists, educators, and the intelligentsia lend themselves to exploitation in the socio-psychological field; while trade unions, trade missions, and foreign aid could be employed on the economic front.

The discussion of the worsening aspects of the bitter Sino-Soviet dispute suggests a third broad objective; to dominate the Communist movement in Latin America.⁴ Toward this end, the Chinese most

⁴"The Chinese Communists obviously seek leadership of the World Communist movement, especially in Asia, Africa, and Latin America," Ralph L. Powell, "Communist China as a Military Power," Current History, Vol. 49, No. 289, Sep 1965, p. 136.

certainly would be on their own; and at times, find themselves in absolute conflict with the Soviet Union in the coordinated accomplishment of their other two objectives.⁵ In the military field, the target for the objective of dominance would be the "peoples' wars of national liberation," where the fundamental issue is "political" versus "armed" struggle. In the political realm, the controversy would rage on ideological grounds of Marxism-Leninism's principles of revolutionary war, as opposed to Soviet "peaceful" revolution.

COURSES OF ACTION

Having isolated three probable broad objectives and some more definitive targets that these objectives suggest, let us examine next Chinese capabilities and the courses of action that are available for their implementation. Capabilities are extremely difficult to discuss in an unclassified paper; for even intelligence information on the Chinese Communists is probably fraught with gaps and errors. Therefore, we can only discuss the more obvious capabilities and limitations. Furthermore, we must constantly bear in mind that much of the Chinese strategy probably will be carried out in coordination and cooperation with International Communism; therefore, Chinese weaknesses may be considerably reinforced. Since a single capability or course of action could support the accomplishment

⁵"This objective can be achieved only at the expense of the Soviet Union," Ibid.

of more than one objective, we shall examine them under the topical headings of military, political, social, and economic.

Military

Even though Red China maintains the largest conventional armed forces in the world,⁶ they realistically possess little capability for physically projecting these masses much beyond their borders.⁷ Therefore, pure military courses of action available to the Chinese in Latin America will be necessarily limited.⁸ Although they cannot send many uniformed personnel abroad, they do have a great capability to project expertise in guerrilla warfare.⁹ From their vast experience in "protracted war," the Chinese are in an excellent position to provide doctrine and guidance in guerrilla warfare to the hot-blood revolutionaries in Latin America.¹⁰ They have also demonstrated the capability to smuggle indigenous personnel out of a country, train them in China, and re-infiltrate them back to their native nations.¹¹

⁶Ibid., p. 137.

⁷For an evaluation of offensive capabilities see Ibid., pp. 136-137.

⁸"The support of revolutions in the less developed areas can only be carried out at the expense of the existing government," Ibid., p. 136.

⁹Robert B. Rigg, in a presentation to the US Army War College on 15 November 1965.

¹⁰"Large numbers of Mao Tse-tung's works, particularly his 'Tactics of a Guerrilla Fighter' in Spanish and Portuguese translations printed in Peiping, Havana, and Rio de Janeiro, are constantly being discovered circulating in the area," Donald M. Wilson before US Congress, House, Sub-committee on Inter-American Affairs, Foreign Affairs Committee, Castro-Communist Subversion In the Western Hemisphere, Feb-Mar 1963, p. 111.

¹¹Rigg, op. cit.

They can support "peoples' war" by these means and by establishing military training missions, or by training "specialists" or "technicians." We have already seen that this latter scheme commenced in Cuba immediately after diplomatic relations were established. There is reasonable evidence to conclude that the Red Chinese have some capability to supply arms, if not other equipment, to the Latin American revolutionary effort. Emilio Juan Navarro, the former commander of Castro's bodyguard, claims he was sent to China in 1960 to be trained on certain Chinese weapons of types which were later introduced into Cuba.¹² Finally, the Chinese have conclusively demonstrated to the world that they now have, at least the capability to detonate an atomic device. This capability, though military in nature, will probably be used primarily as a political and psychological weapon¹³ in the Chinese strategy in the underdeveloped nations.

Political

The Chinese have some capacity for legitimate diplomatic relations. They currently have only their Cuban embassy in this hemisphere; but that country, in turn, maintains embassies in Mexico, Bolivia, Uruguay, and Chile.¹⁴ Furthermore, the USSR and Soviet bloc

¹²Emilio J. Navarro before the US Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Red Chinese Infiltration into Latin America, 4 Aug 1965, pp. 51-53.

¹³Powell, op. cit., p. 141.

¹⁴John A. McCone, before US Congress, House, Sub-committee on Inter-American Affairs, Foreign Affairs Committee, Castro-Communist Subversion in the Western Hemisphere, Feb-Mar 1963, p. 69.

countries have representatives in Mexico, Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, Argentina, Uruguay, and Columbia.¹⁵ This limited diplomatic capability assists the Chinese considerably in their greater capacity to infiltrate agents into Latin America and to move recruits and trainees out. Cuba is the base for these operations; from there the infiltrators may be sent elsewhere according to the need.¹⁶ Cuba has no restriction on Chinese immigration,¹⁷ and it has been estimated that a minimum of 3000 to 4000 Red Chinese infiltrated into Cuba from 1959 to 1965.¹⁸ Latin Americans who travel to Red China do so by way of Havana, Prague or Moscow, and get their visas at the Red Chinese Embassy in Cuba, enroute.¹⁹

The Communist parties in Latin America lend the Red Chinese another considerable capability. The party is legal in Bolivia, Chile, Columbia, Mexico, and Uruguay, but nevertheless functions illegally in the other Latin American nations.²⁰ Altogether, it is estimated that there are 250,000 card-carrying Communists in Latin America,²¹ and every one listens to Moscow and Peiping for inspiration and direction.²² Political penetration and expansion through the "united front" process appears a most lucrative and acceptable political

¹⁵Joseph F. Carroll before Ibid., p. 150.

¹⁶Enrique Chan before US Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Chinese Red Infiltration into Latin America, 4 Aug 1965, p. 37.

¹⁷Jules Dubois, before Ibid., p. 3.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 2.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 15.

²⁰Rollie Poppino, International Communism in Latin America, Appendix I, pp. 224-229.

²¹R. R. Rubottom, "International Communism in Latin America," Department of State Publication 7048, Inter-American Series 60, p. 9.

²²Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League, op. cit., p. 34.

course of action, since this technique has the solid base of existing party organization and the attraction of widespread Soviet support.

The Chinese will want to go beyond the "united front" in their political endeavors. They will always seek to incite or enlarge armed struggle as a primary means for the seizure of political power by elements more sympathetic to Communism.²³ The fomenting of insurrections of sufficient magnitude to induce US intervention (as in the case of Vietnam and the Dominican Republic), is a course of action most apt to be favored by the Chinese.²⁴ Inciting two or more such insurrections simultaneously would create a situation which would place the prestige of the United States in serious jeopardy.²⁵ In some cases, such as the FALN insurgency in Venezuela, armed struggle as a course of action even seems to have Soviet indorsement and support.

²³"force is the midwife of every old society pregnant with the new one," Karl Marx, Capital, Eng. ed., Foreign Languages Publishing House, Vol. 1, p. 751.

²⁴"When committing aggression in a foreign country, US imperialism can only employ part of its forces, which are sent to fight an unjust war far from their native land, and therefore have a low morale, and so US imperialism is beset with great difficulties," Lin Piao, "Long Live the Victory of the Peoples War," Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Supplement No. 171(45) 3 Sep 1965, p. 25.

²⁵"This strategy, Peking believes, is already bearing fruit. The Americans are already deeply bogged down in South Vietnam, and therefore cannot afford to become involved so deeply elsewhere," Donald S. Zagoria, "China's Strategy: A Critique," Commentary, Vol. 40, No. 5, Nov 1965, p. 63.

Socio-psychological

Propaganda is the primary vehicle for indoctrinating the susceptible, inciting dissension and dispute, and spreading lies, distrust, prejudice, and hate. It will be the principal weapon of the Chinese in Latin America, as elsewhere in the world. It will be directed primarily toward youth, students, and the intelligentsia, but it will also be aimed at any audience in the exploitation of any cleavage. One Chinese propaganda network is the New China News Agency,²⁶ which has branches in Cuba, Mexico, Ecuador, Chile, and Uruguay for the distribution of propaganda publications among the Latin American countries.²⁷ Other capabilities for distribution of written propaganda are known to exist. For example, the Chinese propaganda publication "Pekin Informa" is sent from China by mail or air cargo for distribution, and another Chinese publication, "China Reconstructs," is distributed through agents in eleven Latin American countries.²⁸ The total Communist short wave radio propaganda broadcasts, including Cuban, Soviet, European satellites, and Chinese was 415 hours a week in 1963, of which 38½ hours²⁹ was broadcast from China.³⁰

²⁶Dubois, Ross, and Chan, before Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, op. cit., pp. 4, 15, and 34.

²⁷According to the Venezuelan publication "Este y Oeste," 15-30 Jun 1965, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, op. cit., p. 41, also collaborated in Poppino, op. cit., p. 176.

²⁸Dubois, op. cit., pp. 5-7.

²⁹Reported by "Este y Oeste," 15-30 Jun 1965, to have been increased to 56 hours in 1964.

³⁰Donald M. Wilson, before the US Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Red Chinese Infiltration into Latin America, 4 Aug 1965, p. 108.

Chinese regional aims can also be achieved through cultural exchange and visits, which have already been substantiated as a distinct capability. Advantage can be taken of the exotic attraction of things oriental, as well as the appeal that the Chinese revolution, particularly its spectacular achievements in rapid modernization, has to the average Latin American. Visits to China by Latin American Communists and non-Communists alike can assist greatly in advancing Chinese regional objectives.

The overseas Chinese also can have a role in Chicom regional strategy. This large reservoir of resident Chinese may be used as a cover for infiltration of Chinese agents, money and materiel.³¹ Those who do not cooperate in advancing Chinese objectives in their adopted countries are susceptible to blackmail and pressures applied to relatives remaining in China.³²

Economic

In discussing Red China's role in Cuba in Chapter III, we have already seen that the Chinese have a capability to provide foreign aid, and to make reciprocal trade agreements. Up until 1965, the Chinese Communists made available some 894 million dollars in grant aid and 662.7 million dollars in loans to underdeveloped nations of

³¹"Chinese will be smuggled into Latin America and they will buy papers, even birth certificates, and become in a few weeks or a few days 'native born, local citizens'--one Chinese comes in another one goes out," Ross, op. cit., p. 30.

³²Ibid., pp. 30-31. Also, Dubois, op. cit., p. 11.

Asia and Africa.³³ This sum is modest by US standards, but a capability to provide economic assistance is clearly demonstrated. So far, Cuba, has been the only recipient of Chinese economic aid, and it is doubtful if the Chinese enjoy sufficient respectability for much more to be applied in the region in the near future. With respect to trade, beside the Cuban agreements already described, it is general knowledge that the Red Chinese have bought large quantities of wheat from Argentina.³⁴ Obviously, these purchases were for selfish reasons, but it demonstrates a Chinese capability to buy on the world market for hard cash. Sizeable trade agreements have also been entered into with Uruguay, Brazil, and Mexico.³⁵

STRATEGIC CONCEPT

Let us now summarize these possible Chinese regional objectives, together with logical targets and courses of action and seek to develop a tentative strategic concept.

The ultimate goal of the Chinese Communists is the defeat of United States "imperialism." This coincides with the overall ambition of the Soviet Union. Latin America, lying on the southeastern flank of the North American continent, is vital to the achievement of this goal.

³³Melvin Gurtov, "Communist China's Foreign Aid Program," Current History, Vol. 49, No. 289, Sep 1965, p. 151.

³⁴Senate Judiciary Committee, op. cit., p. 45.

³⁵Ibid., pp. 33, 44, and 45.

Current Chinese Communist objectives in Latin America, commensurate with this ultimate goal, are to weaken US influence, to advance Communism, particularly the Chinese brand of Communism; and to dominate the Communist movement. These objectives will be accomplished, insofar as possible, within the context of International Communism, taking maximum advantage of its organizational and financial support. The Chinese objective to dominate the Communist movement in Latin America will usually be subordinated to the requirement for continued Soviet support.

The Chinese will seek to attain these objectives through simultaneous application of the military, political, ideological, and economic means at their disposal. Principal courses of action will be:

1. To create constant chaos and disorder through exploitation of disputes, discontent, and grievances, by means of propaganda, infiltration of dissident groups, and agitation of leaders.

2. To attack, through propaganda and political action, all vestiges of "Yankee imperialism," to include US military presence, US nation building activities, US economic and development enterprises, and regional collective organizations and institutions, such as the United Nations, OAS, and the Alliance for Progress.

3. To develop anti-government, anti-American, and anti-imperialist forces, through indoctrination, training, and provision of arms.

4. To expand Communist political power through political action of the Communist parties, the "united front" process, and infiltration of agents and sympathizers.

5. To incite and support "peoples' wars of national liberation" in order to weaken and destroy hostile governments and to induce US intervention.

6. To win over the Communist Parties and fellow travelers to the Chinese interpretation of Marxism-Leninism and to dominate the "revisionists" through propaganda and political action.

7. To create the Chinese image of world revolution in Latin America through indoctrination and dissemination of propaganda that is directed primarily at students, educators, youth, and the intelligentsia.

8. To establish trade missions and representatives in Latin American nations in order to expand Chinese influence, create economic ties, and obtain needed raw materials.

9. To strengthen cultural interflow between Red China and Latin America through visits, exchange of students, and the establishment of cultural and friendship societies.

CHAPTER 5

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

GENERAL

In this final step of the analysis, we will test the tentative strategic concept in the light of some recent "indicators" on the world scene. These "indicators" will consist of both actual events and statements or opinions of knowledgeable persons, which tend to support or deny the element of the strategy being discussed. An effort will be made to include both the Western and Communist points of view. The elements of the tentative strategic concept will be those set forth in Chapter 4; however, to avoid repetition, only enough of each element to identify the objective or course of action will be restated.

NATIONAL OBJECTIVES

To Weaken US Influence

That the United States is the Chinese enemy, Comrade Mao Tse-tung leaves little doubt. "Our common enemy is US imperialism,"¹ he told delegates from 14 Latin American nations in Tsinan on 3 May 1960. "We should unite and drive US imperialism from Asia, Africa, and Latin America,"² he told another such group eleven days later in

¹"Chairman Mao Tse-tung's Important Talks with Guests from Asia, Africa, and Latin America, Foreign Languages Press, p. 1.

²Ibid., p. 8.

Wuhan. Lin Piao refined the strategy in his September 1965 thesis by saying.

Comrade Mao Tse-tung formulated the strategy for protracted war. China's war of resistance would be protracted and prolonged efforts would be needed to gradually weaken the enemy's forces and expand our own so the enemy would change from being strong to being weak and we would change from being weak to being strong and accumulate sufficient strength finally to defeat him.³

Is it not reasonable, therefore, that the Chinese would seek to weaken the US position in their Latin American strategy?

On the Western side, the Chinese Communist objective of weakening the United States is also clear. James Duncan, a former Canadian deputy minister, told the US House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Sub-committee on the Far East and Pacific, that the Chinese are spending \$250 million a year to spread hatred for American government and principles in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.⁴ The Chinese, he claimed, are cooperating with national liberation movements to keep the United States running hither and thither putting out the fires of sedition until it is exhausted.⁵

Another American writer points out that a strategy of overextending and exhausting a great power is ideally suited to the limited material resources of an inferior power such as China, as it requires

³Lin Piao, "Long Live the Victory of People's War," Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report Supplement (Far East), No. 171(45), 3 Sep 1965, p. 5.

⁴Richard Halloran, "Expelling US Held Main Aim of Peking," Washington Post, 21 Feb 1966, p. A26.

⁵Ibid.

no large investment either of Chinese manpower or materiel.⁶ The main Chinese objective, this writer goes on to say, "is to weaken their principal national enemy, the United States."⁷

The Latin American correspondent for the Chicago Tribune and author of the book "Operation America," Mr. Jules Dubois, recently told the US Senate Committee on the Judiciary, that "the Red Chinese wish to deny to the United States any role in Latin America."⁸ "Communist China has one objective," he testified, "to organize, agitate, and subvert the Latin American nations to attempt to destroy the United States."⁹

Our Nationalist Chinese allies, ever watchful of their belligerent mainland antagonist, express their support for the selection of this objective. They believe that any plan to create Communist satellites in America would first isolate the United States and undermine its prestige.¹⁰ The Chinese Communist, therefore, will seek to weaken American prestige in Latin America and wreck the Organization of American States. Furthermore, the Red Chinese will seek to induce the Latin American countries to reappraise their policies toward the United States.¹¹

⁶Donald S. Zagoria, "China's Strategy--A Critique," Commentary, Vol. 40, No. 5, Nov 1965, p. 63.

⁷Ibid.

⁸Jules Dubois, testifying before the US Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Red Chinese Infiltration into Latin America, 4 Aug 1965, p. 8.

⁹Ibid., p. 9.

¹⁰Asian People's Anti-Communist League, Latin America's Red Peril, p. 25.

¹¹Asian People's Anti-Communist League, Chinese Communist Expansion and Rivalry with the Soviet Union in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, p. 69.

To Advance Communism

This broad objective is so very obvious that little time need be spent in supporting it. Despite Moscow-Peking differences in tactics, both aim to Communize Latin America.¹² As one prominent American statesman expressed it, "These (Chinese Communist) leaders have publicly proclaimed a dogma which demands that all non-Communist states must be communized."¹³

To Dominate the Communist Movement

The recent Tri-Continental Solidarity Conference held in Havana in January 1966, clearly underlined the struggle for dominance in the Latin American Communist movement. Reporting on the accomplishments of the conference the Peking Review stated, "The tri-continental conference was the scene of a serious struggle: the struggle between two lines. Should one resolutely combat imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism headed by the United States or practice peaceful coexistence with them?"¹⁴

On 6 December 1965 the Washington Post reported that the Soviet newspaper Izvestia attacked the Chinese for what it termed "splitting" activities among the world Communist parties. "There are leaders of

¹²Ibid., p. 64.

¹³Marshall Green, "Communist China: A Problem in U.S. Policy-making," Department of State Foreign Affairs Outline, No. 11, May 1965, p. 2.

¹⁴Editorial, "The Tide of the People's Anti-Imperialist Revolutionary Struggle is Irresistible," Peking Review, Vol. IX, No. 4, 21 Jan 1966, p. 25.

the Communist Party in China who are openly for a split, who are striving organizationally to be separated from the parties struggling for the unity of action against imperialism," the Izvestia report related.¹⁵

The Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs claims that Red China aspires to the leadership of the socialist camp as well as the defeat of "modern revisionism," which it sees as corrupting the world Communist movement. Increasingly, it craves leadership, and identifies China with that majority of the world's population that lives in less privileged circumstances.¹⁶

Another American views the same proposition more specifically. He states, "There is a tremendous battle among pro-Russian and pro-Chinese Communists in Latin America. Nevertheless, their lines of communication have remained intact."¹⁷ What this spokesman is actually saying is that, although the Chinese seek to dominate in Latin America, they are not imprudent enough to move entirely independently of International Communism.

Courses of Action

1. To create chaos and discord. Manifestations of Communist attempts to create chaos and disorder in Latin America appear almost

¹⁵"Russia Assails China on Disunity," Washington Post, 7 Dec 1965, p. c7.

¹⁶Green, op. cit., p. 2.

¹⁷Stanley Ross testifying before US Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Red Chinese Infiltration into Latin America, 4 Aug 1965, p. 23.

daily in our newspapers and tabloids. From the Washington Post come these typical examples:

18 Sep 1965--"Columbia has launched troops and war planes against what were described as Communist-led bandits."

26 Oct 1965--"Chile's two biggest copper mines, both American owned, were shut down by a strike of 13,000 workers."

18 Dec 1965--"Widespread strikes in the Dominican Republic are imperiling what otherwise is considered as a period of constructive consolidation. . . . Dominican officials acknowledge that the union is left-wing. It is seen as attempting to defy the government for political reasons."

10 Jan 1966--"Rumors in Guatemala that a coup against the military regime--may soon take place. The Guatemalan Communists have extended their terrorist struggle into Guatemala City, apparently waiting to capitalize on the chaos that would accompany any uprising."

Infiltration of agents to foment discord and disorder is another favored technique. In 1964, when the pro-Communist government was overthrown by the Army in Brazil, a vast network of Communist conspiracy was discovered with direction from Peking.¹⁸ Nine Chinese were placed on trial by the military government,¹⁹ and all were convicted as agents and deported from the country.²⁰

¹⁸Ibid., p. 20.

¹⁹"Breath of the Dragon," Time Magazine, 11 Sep 1964, p. 27.

²⁰Emilio Julian Navarro testifying before US Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Red Chinese Infiltration into Latin America, 4 Aug 1965, p. 57.

An example of creating discord through propaganda is apparent in this extract from "Pekin Informa," 30 June 1965:

This shows that (if) the "underdeveloped" countries in Latin America in the post-war years would have taken possession of all the firms controlled by North American capital, and would have used them in order to accumulate national capital instead of making them serve North American monopolies--to extract profits--it would have been completely possible that those countries would have been liberated from the foreign "aid" and of the foreign loans and would create favorable conditions for the development of their own national economy.²¹

2. To attack all vestiges of "Yankee imperialism." Mao Tse-tung keynoted the propaganda theme in Nanchang in 1961, when addressing important Cuban guests; "Our aim is one, to oppose imperialism. U.S. imperialism is the biggest imperialism. It opposes not only us but you also. It oppresses people all over the world."²²

A throng of other Chinese propagandists joined the chorus. Here are some examples:

"Imperialist dumping has severely hurt food production in--Latin American countries, causing severe shortages."²³

"Washington's dirty work in the Brazilian camp is another ugly chapter of U.S. domination and interference in Latin America."²⁴

"The large-scale export of capital is the most outstanding feature in the enslavement and plunder of Latin America by the U.S."²⁵

²¹Dubois, op. cit., p. 8.

²²Foreign Languages Press, "Cuba Si-Yanguis No," p. 9.

²³Editorial, "Imperialism and Post-war Food Problems in Asia, Africa, and Latin America," Peking Review, 30 July 1965, p. 13.

²⁴"Brazilian Coup: Made in USA," Round the World, Peking Review, 10 Apr 1964, p. 24.

²⁵Chang Chik Ching, Foreign Languages Press, "Cuba Si-Yanguis No," p. 154.

"The Panamanian people are struggling to recover their sovereignty over the Canal Zone."²⁶

"The Chinese people resolutely support the Cuban people in their struggle for the recovery of Guantanamo, the U.S. military base in Cuba."²⁷

The U.S. viewpoint also tends to support this course of action. Testifying before a sub-committee of the U.S House of Representatives, a prominent American reported that Radio Havana devoted considerable time to attacking the Venezuelan land reform program, which it called a tool of the Yanqui Alliance for Progress.²⁸ Appearing before the same group another U.S. official testified that, so long as Castro-Communists conduct subversive operations in the hemisphere, the Alliance for Progress will be a constant object of their scorn and attack.²⁹

3. To develop anti-government, anti-American, and anti-imperialist forces. There are firm indications that the Chinese quickly recognized the importance of Cuba for the establishment of a revolutionary base in the Western Hemisphere.³⁰ In September 1961, Chairman Lin Shao-Chi assured his guest, President Dorticos of Cuba, that, "The Chinese people are ready to do their best to support and

²⁶Chu Tu-nan, Ibid., p. 86.

²⁷Peng Chen, Ibid., p. 48.

²⁸Donald M. Wilson testifying before US House, Sub-committee on Inter-American Affairs, Foreign Affairs Committee, Castro-Communist Subversion in the Western Hemisphere, "Feb-Mar 1963, p. 109.

²⁹Edwin M. Martin, before the US House, Sub-committee on Inter-American Affairs, Foreign Affairs Committee, Castro-Communist Subversion in the Western Hemisphere, 14 Mar 1963, p. 6.

³⁰Dubois, op. cit., p. 9.

aid the revolutionary cause of the Cuban people."³¹ Then, in
toasting his visitor, Lin Shao added, "To the victory of the
national-democratic movements in Latin America."³² In September 1962,
the tenth plenum of the Chinese Communist Party resolved that, "we
should continue. . .to give active support to the struggle of the. . .
Latin American people."³³

From the U.S. viewpoint, implementation of this course of action
is regarded as a "fait accompli," with at least two trends apparent.
The first is the firm conclusion that Castro's Cuba is International
Communism's strategic base for subversive aggression in Latin America.³⁴
Training of guerrillas and terrorists takes place at Cuban camps where
experts in subversive warfare are organizing the cadre for an
"alliance for violence," that will send agents trained in sabotage,
espionage and revolutionary techniques throughout Latin America.³⁵
These are the firm conclusions of a U.S. House of Representatives
investigating committee, that are based on the testimony of many
prominent witnesses.³⁶ One witness claims that an "international

³¹Foreign Languages Press, "Cuba Si-Yanguis No," p. 15.

³²Ibid., p. 16.

³³"Peking Radio Broadcast in English," New China News Agency,
28 Sep 1962.

³⁴"Castro-Communist subversive aggression in Latin America is
an integral part of Communist global strategy," Finding of the US
House, Sub-committee on Inter-American Affairs, Foreign Affairs
Committee, Castro-Communist Subversion in the Western Hemisphere,
14 Mar 1963, p. 5.

³⁵Ibid., p. 7.

³⁶Ibid., p. 5-7. For extremely interesting testimony see that
of General Joseph F. Carroll, Honorable Edwin M. Martin, and Dr.
Manuel A. DeVarona before US House, Sub-committee on Inter-American
Affairs, Foreign Affairs Committee, Castro-Communist Subversion in
the Western Hemisphere, Feb-Mar 1963, pp. 7, 80, 82, 85, 87, and 151.

revolutionary command" has been set up in Havana under the supervision of Soviet Colonel Jaraslav Volenkesky, Chinese Lin Chiao Yin, and Spanish General Alberto Bayo.³⁷ The same witness adds, that at a guerrilla training camp in Managua, Cuba, Panamanians were given a special course which would qualify them as saboteurs in the Canal Zone.³⁸ Another qualified witness before a Senate committee reports a Chinese training center at a place called Tarara, about 25 miles from Havana.³⁹

The second trend in the U.S. view, and one that is supported by Western press accounts, is that the training and support activities which are based in Cuba have spread to sites and camps throughout the region. The most vivid accounts come from Brazil, which has since barely survived a Communist take over. It is interesting to note that, as early as November 1960, their congressman Francisco Juliao went to Red China to seek financial assistance for the "peasant leagues," which he sponsored in Brazil. The government of Red China reportedly promised him aid, which would be rendered through Cuba. This aid was given on the condition that it would be used mainly in the organization of guerrillas in Brazil.⁴⁰

³⁷DeVarona, op. cit., p. 82.

³⁸Ibid., p. 85.

³⁹"Some of these activities take the form of a very sinister school for training Chinese agents and Latin Americans who do work for China at a place called Tarara, which is about 25 miles outside of Havana." Ross, op. cit., p. 17.

⁴⁰DeVarona, op. cit., p. 84.

Numerous reports from other Latin American countries support this trend of the spreading training movement.⁴¹ For example, on 25 January 1963 the Argentine police reportedly uncovered a military training camp a few miles north of the city of Santa Fe. It was being operated by the Castro-Communist organization called Tacaura. Quantities of automatic weapons and explosives were confiscated.⁴² Another report concerns British Guiana, where on 6 February 1963 U.S. government sources disclosed that two ship-loads of arms reportedly left the Cuban port of Mariel, bound for Georgetown.⁴³

4. To expand Communist political power. As early as 1960, the Chinese Communists reported that broad patriotic democratic fronts, with the participation of the Communist parties, had been established in Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, and Paraguay.⁴⁴ Then in his famous September 1965 speech Defense Minister Lin Piao announced clearly and emphatically the general Chinese strategy of the united front.

It is imperative to build the broadest possible united front.⁴⁵ .revolution embraces in its ranks not only workers, peasants, and urban petty bourgeoisie, but also national bourgeoisie and other patriotic and anti-imperialist democrats. In the struggle against

⁴¹For a detailed listing of similar reports from many Latin American nations see US House, Sub-committee on Inter-American Affairs, Foreign Affairs Committee, Castro-Communist Subversion in the Western Hemisphere, Feb-Mar 1963, pp. 73-81.

⁴²United Press International, Santa Fe, 25 Jan 1963.

⁴³Washington Evening Star, 6 Feb 1963.

⁴⁴See extract from the Peking Review, US Senate Judiciary Committee, Documentation of Communist Penetration in Latin America, 2 Oct 1963, p. 135.

⁴⁵Lin Piao, op. cit., p. 6.

imperialism and its lackeys, it is necessary to rally all anti-imperialist patriotic forces. . .all those patriotic persons from among the bourgeoisie and other exploiting classes who join in the anti-imperialist struggle play a progressive historical role.⁴⁶ History shows that within the united front the Communist party must maintain its ideological, political, and organizational independence. . .and insist upon its leading role. Since there are class differences among various classes of the united front, the Party must have a correct policy in order to develop the progressive forces, win over middle forces and oppose die-hard forces.⁴⁷ . . .our Party policy regarding work within the united front (is) one of both alliance and struggle.⁴⁸

The Chinese propaganda publication, "Pekin Informa," also stressed the importance of the united front strategy. In a pointed article entitled, "It Is Totally Possible to Defeat North American Imperialism," it states, "Provided that all the people of the world. . .unite all the susceptible forces. . .to form the most ample single front possible against North American imperialism and its lackeys, this ferocious enemy will be defeated."⁴⁹

During the 21st Congress of the Soviet Communist Party that was attended by the Chinese in 1959, it was apparently decided that the full weight of the Communist apparatus in Latin America should be thrown behind the Cuban revolution, and that there should be improved coordination between all Communist parties to make this more effective.⁵⁰ The Soviets felt that the method by which China was infiltrated and taken over would be especially effective in Latin

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 23.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 9.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 6.

⁴⁹"It Is Totally Possible to Defeat North American Imperialism," Pekin Informa, 16 Jun 1965, p. 13.

⁵⁰R. R. Rubottom, "International Communism in Latin America," Department of State Publication 7048, Inter-American Series 60, Aug 1960, pp. 7-8.

America.⁵¹ It was known as early as 1959 that behind the facade of the New China News Agency and other cultural and commercial missions, infiltration had reached unprecedented levels.⁵² One qualified U.S. observer stated that he knew of five "Hsinhan" news correspondents in Mexico, one of whom was reported to be a lieutenant colonel in the intelligence service of Red China.⁵³ Another American stated that he also believed that Red Chinese infiltration of the Western Hemisphere was proceeding at a "tremendous pace," through the consulates of Latin American countries in Europe, which had been granting visas to Chinese. He further believed that the headquarters for Chinese infiltration into Latin America is the Cuban embassy in Mexico.⁵⁴ And finally, the Deputy Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency made this statement, in part, to congressional committeemen. "The Communist subversion campaign (in Latin America) incorporates the exploitation of nationalist and ultra-leftist groups, attempted infiltration. . . (and) intensive ideological indoctrination."⁵⁵

5. To incite and support "peoples' war" and to induce U.S. intervention. It is probable that this course of action is the one most favored by the Chinese, and directly or indirectly all others

⁵¹Spruille Braden, Syllabus on the Communist Threat in the Americas, 1953, p. 2.

⁵²Enrique Chan, testifying before the US Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Red Chinese Infiltration into Latin America, 4 Aug 1965, p. 34.

⁵³Dubois, op. cit., p. 15.

⁵⁴Ross, op. cit., pp. 23 and 30.

⁵⁵Alva R. Fitch, before the US House, Sub-committee on Inter-American Affairs, Foreign Affairs Committee, Communism in Latin America, Feb-Mar 1965, p. 8.

are designed to support it. The "peoples' war" is Mao's projection of his thesis that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun." He clearly pointed out, "The seizure of power by armed force, the settlement of the issue by war, is the central task and the highest form of revolution. This Marxist-Leninist principle of revolution holds good universally, for China and for all other countries."⁵⁶ Lin Piao elaborates on this theory. Says he,

In the final analysis, the whole cause of world revolution hinges on the revolutionary struggles of the Asian, African, and Latin American peoples, who make up the overwhelming majority of the world's population.⁵⁷ It has become an urgent necessity for the people in many countries to master and use peoples' war as a weapon against U.S. imperialism and its lackeys.⁵⁸ The more successful the development of peoples' war in a given region, the larger the number of U.S. imperialist forces that can be pinned down there.⁵⁹

Our Nationalist Chinese allies list this course of action also in their analysis of the overall Chinese Communist strategy. They claim that the Red Chinese "support Latin American leftists to usurp political power by violence and force and turn national and democratic revolutions into socialist revolutions."⁶⁰ The Chicoms are die-hard Leninists, they say, and have already goaded leftists in various Latin American countries to carry on anti-imperialist struggles on

⁵⁶Mao Tse-tung, "Problems of War and Strategy," Selected Works, Vol. 2, p. 88.

⁵⁷Lin Piao, op. cit., p. 22.

⁵⁸Ibid., p. 2.

⁵⁹Ibid., p. 26.

⁶⁰Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League, Chinese Communist Expansion and Rivalry with the Soviet Union in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, p. 65.

the basis of the Chinese Communist revolutionary experience.⁶¹ The Red Chinese have helped the Communists in Brazil, Guatemala, Venezuela, and Columbia in armed revolts of various scales.⁶²

Promoting armed revolution abroad is considered the principal Chinese military capability in the opinion of many Americans. Of course, the military aspects are usually combined with "other forms of struggle"; political, psychological, and economic. Here is how some of them express it. "Undisputed evidence exists that Fidel Castro is spurring and supporting the efforts of the Communists and other revolutionary elements to overthrow and seize control of governments in Latin America,"⁶³ said the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. "I should note that Venezuela is apparently number one on the priority list for revolution. We have learned that the Communist party leadership in Venezuela feels a peaceful solution to the present situation is out of the question."⁶⁴ The former Ambassador to Venezuela concurs with this latter observation.⁶⁵

⁶¹Ibid., p. 60.

⁶²Ibid., p. 8.

⁶³John A. McCone, testifying before the US House, Sub-committee on Inter-American Affairs, Foreign Affairs Committee, Castro-Communist Subversion in the Western Hemisphere, Feb-Mar 1963, p. 65.

⁶⁴Ibid., p. 64.

⁶⁵"There is no question that Venezuela is the No. 1 target of Communist Cuba. It is a very rich prize. There are over \$5 billion dollars worth of foreign investments in that country. There is a very rich oil industry," C. Allan Stewart before the US House, Sub-committee on Inter-American Affairs, Foreign Affairs Committee, Castro-Communist Subversion in the Western Hemisphere, Feb-Mar 1963, p. 52.

Furthermore, a prominent newsman claims under oath that a man named German Lairer, who had been to Cuba and had addressed 600 Venezuelans in a guerrilla training camp there, told reporters that the Chinese had taken over the leadership and they were going to make Venezuela the "Vietnam of Latin America." Lairer also alleged to have said that the "Chinese have told us that the war will take a long time and we should not hope for a rapid victory." He predicted U.S. intervention into Venezuela if the Communists made any more progress.⁶⁶

6. To strengthen cultural interflow. Cultural relations with Latin America have been fostered for more than a decade as a tactic of the Chinese, and for a much longer period by the Soviets. In 1953 the Association of Chinese-Mexican Friends was formed by Mexican Communists, which distributed propaganda in the nature of appeals to visit Red China.⁶⁷ In 1954, the Chinese Communists joined the Association of Chinese-Brazilian Friends in Rio.⁶⁸ Additionally, since 1959, Peiping has sent various groups to Latin America, who represented culture, athletics, and the sciences.⁶⁹

The Director of the U.S. Information Agency estimated that by 1960 there were 69 Communist bloc cultural centers in Latin America, nine of which were Chinese.⁷⁰ The Association of Friends of China

⁶⁶Ross, op. cit., pp. 17-19.

⁶⁷Chan, op. cit., p. 32.

⁶⁸Ibid.

⁶⁹Ibid., p. 33.

⁷⁰George V. Allen, testifying before the US House, Sub-committee on Inter-American Affairs, Foreign Affairs Committee, The Communist Threat in Latin America, Jun 1960, p. 69.

and Latin America was formed that same year in Peking, and became the general fortress of cultural infiltration into Latin America. Similar associations were established in Cuba, Venezuela, Chile, Brazil, Argentina, Peru, Uruguay, Columbia, Ecuador, Mexico, and Paraguay. From 1960 to 1963, Peking sent more than 60 cultural missions to seven Latin American countries, and invited more than 250 persons and cultural organizations to visit China.⁷¹ Emilio J. Navarro, former commander of Castro's body guard, testified in the US Senate that he had seen several of these Latin American delegations while he was in Peking.⁷²

The Honorable Donald M. Wilson, Deputy Director of the USIA, pointed out that Latin American students are a special target for Communist cultural activities, and that student organizations are particularly cultivated toward this end.⁷³ By the time he testified before the House Sub-committee for Inter-American Affairs in February 1963, USIA had revised their estimate of the number of Communist binational centers and friendship societies in Latin America upward to 170.⁷⁴

⁷¹Translation from Este y Oeste, 15-30 Jun 1965, US Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Red Chinese Infiltration into Latin America, 4 Aug 1965, p. 41.

⁷²Navarro, op. cit., p. 49.

⁷³Donald M. Wilson, testifying before US House, Sub-committee on Inter-American Affairs, Foreign Affairs Committee, Castro-Communist Subversion in the Western Hemisphere, Feb-Mar 1963, pp. 112-113.

⁷⁴Ibid., p. 112.

7. To create the Chinese image. Peiping is in a good position to exploit the many disappointments and frustrations of our times, and to identify itself as the leader of the less-developed nations in the world, where the gap between the "have" and "have not" countries seems to be growing.⁷⁵ In 1960, it was noted that Chairman Mao Tse-tung appeared to have gone out of his way to receive Latin American Communist leaders, and to exhort them to give their full backing to the kind of revolution which he liked.⁷⁶ The Chinese Communists spared no effort to make a favorable impression on Latin American visitors, who were flattered by the hospitality and special treatment accorded to them by their hosts. Latin American Communists who had never seen Stalin or Malenkov or Khrushchev were received in audience by Chairman Mao Tse-tung and Foreign Minister Chou En-lai.⁷⁷

Chinese propaganda that was directed toward these visitors, and towards Latin Americans at home, concentrated on two themes. The first of these portrayed the Chinese Peoples' Republic as a legitimate, peace-loving and increasingly powerful member of the community of nations. The second, cast the U.S. in the role of international villain, as a war-mongering, imperialist power bent on keeping Latin America in "colonial bondage."⁷⁸

As an example of the first theme, note the soft words of Chairman Mao to a group of Latin American delegates to trade unions

⁷⁵Green, op. cit., p. 2.

⁷⁶Rubottom, op. cit., pp. 2-3.

⁷⁷Rollie Poppino, International Communism in Latin America, p. 175.

⁷⁸Ibid., pp. 176-177.

and womens' organizations. "The people of the whole world, including the people of the United States, are our friends."⁷⁹ Then the usually vitriolic Peking Review cooed, "The emergence of New China is like a great beacon light on the Pacific Coast. In their struggle for national independence, freedom and social progress, the oppressed nations, and particularly Asian, African, and Latin American nations, find in New China an enormous encouragement, a reliable guarantee and a brilliant example."⁸⁰

On the other key, we find a Red Chinese official addressing the founding of the China-Latin American Friendship Association, as follows:

The Chinese people struggled for nearly 100 years under imperialist aggression. . . The imperialists once seized our territories, slaughtered our people and robbed us of our wealth, both material and cultural. Foreign gun-boats once roamed our territorial sea and inland waters unchecked, and foreign capitalists once whipped, shot-down and killed our workers.⁸¹

This is a similar line from Lin Piao, "the revolutionary peoples of the world. . . will wipe off the earth once and for all the common enemy of all the peoples; U.S. imperialism and its lackeys."⁸²

Propaganda is an important arm of the Communist subversive apparatus in Latin America. Much of the material is aimed at students from the university to the grade school level.⁸³ On 18 January 1963,

⁷⁹Foreign Languages Press, "Cuba Si-Yanguis No," pp. 4-5.

⁸⁰Hoang Van Hoan, Peking Review, 23 July 1965, p. 9.

⁸¹Foreign Languages Press, "Cuba Si-Yanguis No," p. 77.

⁸²Lin Piao, op. cit., p. 30.

⁸³US House, Sub-committee on Inter-American Affairs, Foreign Affairs Committee, Castro-Communist Subversion in the Western Hemisphere, 14 Mar 1963, p. 3.

the Venezuelan police searched the University of Caracas and found great quantities of subversive propaganda and compromising documents, thereby confirming that the student dormitories were being used as a general headquarters for Castro-Communist agents.⁸⁴ There can be little doubt that Communism seeks to conquer the university before taking control of the slums.⁸⁵

8. To establish trade representatives or missions. In discussing Red China's role in Cuba in Chapter III, we noted that the Chinese Communists entered into agreements to buy Cuban sugar and to advance limited economic assistance in the form of an interest-free loan.⁸⁶ Although economic assistance apparently has not been employed on a wide scale in Latin America, the Chinese Reds have purchased limited quantities of Latin American export commodities. For example, Chile announced an agreement to sell 10,000 tons of copper for \$8,000,000 to Communist China in late 1963.⁸⁷ A trade mission from Peking signed an agreement with the Chilean government in February 1964 for 5,000 more tons of copper.⁸⁸ Argentina signed an agreement with Communist China for the sale of 750,000 tons of wheat in 1963 for a price that was higher than that quoted on the world market.⁸⁹ Mexican trade with Peking, virtually nil in 1962 and only about \$3 million in 1963,

⁸⁴United Press International, Caracas, 18 Jan 1963.

⁸⁵DeVarona, op. cit., p. 90.

⁸⁶"Actually, 'self-reliance' has been the main theme of Chinese economic policy since 1961." Yuan-Li Wu, "China's Economy and Its Prospects," Current History, Vol. 47, No. 277, Sep 1964, p. 172.

⁸⁷Deadline Data, Chinese Communist Foreign Policy, 27 Nov 1963.

⁸⁸Translation from Este y Oeste, US Senate Judiciary Committee, op. cit., p. 44.

⁸⁹Norman Ingrey, "Argentine Wheat Goes to Peking," Christian Science Monitor, 9 Mar 1963, p. 4.

reportedly jumped to more than \$35 million in 1964.⁹⁰ Peking also imported large quantities of foodstuffs from Brazil and woolen goods from Uruguay. Political infiltration into these countries allegedly followed the trade expansion.⁹¹

In the Chinese Nationalist view, their mainland brethren are themselves backward in the economic field, and are not in a position to make a substantial economic infiltration into Latin America.⁹² In the light of what the Chicoms have already done in Asia and Africa,⁹³ this would not necessarily be so; however, they do seem to have a cynical view of foreign aid. "Foreign aid," says Lin Piao, "can only play a supplementary role."⁹⁴ But Chen I's language is stronger; says he, "The more foreign aid with conditions attached a country receives, the more difficult it will be for it to stand up. This is like drinking poison to quench one's thirst."⁹⁵

9. To win over the Communist parties. In August 1960, Delores Ibarruri, the famous "La Pasionaria" of the Spanish civil war, wrote an urgent letter to the Secretary General of the Spanish and Portuguese Communist Parties, in which she described Chinese inroads into the Latin American Communist movement. She wrote,

⁹⁰"64 Mexican Trade With Peking Said to Top \$35 Million," Washington Post, 30 Sep 1965, p. A2.

⁹¹Translation from Este y Oeste, US Senate Judiciary Committee, op. cit., pp. 40-41.

⁹²Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League, Latin America's Red Peril, p. 7.

⁹³Melvin Gurtov, "Communist China's Foreign Aid Program," Current History, Vol. 49, No. 289, Sep 1965, p. 151.

⁹⁴Lin Piao, op. cit., p. 19.

⁹⁵Chen I, Foreign Broadcast Information Service Supplement, Foreign Radio Broadcasts, No. 197(65), 12 Oct 1965, p. 7.

The danger is in our own number. The Chinese comrades, who have organized very well in Cuba, but not for the convenience of world Communism, but for the convenience of Chinese Communism, which is doing everything to be Number One. . . . I tell you this, because not only have they placed activists in all the Spanish Americas, but they are also trying to capture Fidel.⁹⁶

From this, it would seem that the Soviets were not unaware of Chinese "separatist" ambitions in the Latin American Communist movement, even at this early date.

The official Chinese propaganda line makes "no bones" about their attitude toward "revisionism." They claim that the "revisionists" are working hand in glove with the imperialists, and are scheming to undermine the peoples' war by overt or covert means.⁹⁷ "Khrushchev revisionists," they say, "have cast the fundamental tenets of Marxism-Leninism to the four winds."⁹⁸

Ernesto Che Guevara, more than a year before his strange disappearance, chose to echo the Chinese line.

The peoples' vanguard in their wars of liberation followed the road of using irregular armed struggle to oppose a militarily superior enemy. Asia, Africa, and Latin America have always been the stage for guerrilla wars, where people strive to seize state power in their struggle against exploitation by feudalism and old and new colonialism.⁹⁹

Guevara always seemed partial to Peking, whereas Castro has tended

⁹⁶Jules Dubois, Operation Americas, pp. 36-37.

⁹⁷Lin Piao, op. cit., p. 27.

⁹⁸Ibid.

⁹⁹Ernesto Che Guevara, "Guerrilla Warfare-A Means," Peking Review, 10 Jan 1964, p. 14.

to favor Moscow.¹⁰⁰ Some say this explains why Guevara has disappeared.¹⁰¹

There are other indications that the "Yenan Way" is finding favor among Latin American Communists. A Bolivian Communist stated that they feel closer to poor struggling China than to rich, powerful, bourgeoisie Russia.¹⁰² Guatemalan guerrillas, headed by Francisco Granados, reportedly spoke of nothing but their admiration for Mao Tse-tung and how his revolutionary methods are more applicable to the racial and social conditions of Guatemala.¹⁰³ Cayetano Rodriguez del Prado, young leader of the Dominican Popular Movement, claimed he could not get along with local Russian Communists, and that he had discussed "revisionism" with Mao Tse-tung in 1964.¹⁰⁴ In still another report of the official Communist party of Columbia, Giullermo Vieira, for more than 20 years its secretary general, was accused of being a "traitor to the Marxist-Leninist principles and of the popular interests." On 17 June 1965, the Party voted the expulsion of Vieira and his group, and authorized regional committees to take measures against known followers of "former comrade" Vieira.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁰Ross, op. cit., p. 20.

¹⁰¹For two interesting accounts, see U.S. News and World Report, 20 Sep 1965, p. 30, and the Washington Post, "Che Executed, Mexican Says," 7 Dec 1965, p. A13.

¹⁰²Time Magazine, "Breath of the Dragon," 11 Sep 1964, p. 27.

¹⁰³Ross, op. cit., p. 24.

¹⁰⁴Georgie Anne Geyer, "Dominican Red Is for Peking," Washington Post, 25 Nov 1965, p. A20.

¹⁰⁵Ross, op. cit., p. 20.

Conclusions

Communist China has advanced to a point in history where it must be reckoned with separately on the international scene. Hitherto, it has been regarded by the West as simply part of the Communist bloc, firmly united with the International Communist movement in a common objective to Communize the world. To a large degree this belief is still valid. Both the Chinese and the Soviets view the world as being divided into two camps--communist and non-communist. Both are certain that the communists are going to win, and that the non-communists are going to lose. But how the victory will be accomplished, and who will lead it and dominate it, are the real roots of the Sino-Soviet split. These issues are irreconcilable. The Russian interest can only be served if the Chinese would be a good puppet to Soviet Communism. The Chinese interest cannot subscribe to such a role.

Because of their mutual hostility toward the United States and the West, the Chinese and Soviet strategies will coincide to the greatest possible degree. The Soviet world-wide advantage is in its military and economic strength. Since these power factors are quite vital to the Chinese strategy, close cooperation with the Soviet Union on basic issues will continue. The Chinese world-wide advantage is primarily ideological. Its appeal to Latin Americans, and other people of the underdeveloped regions, cannot be ignored by the Soviet Union. Therefore, in these areas the Chinese flavor of Communism may be expected to be strong.

Lin Piao's statement of 2 September 1965 is undoubtedly the Chinese strategic blueprint for the future. For this reason his utterances are widely used in illustrating, reinforcing, and supporting elements of the foregoing analysis. Unfortunately, speeches and public statements are often designed with domestic and international reaction in mind, rather than to promulgate official policy. We know that the Chinese are by nature practical and pragmatic people, who might not necessarily do what they say they will do. However, behind the embellishments of belligerency and rancor of Lin Piao's remarks lie a real Chinese formula for world revolution. The long struggle of the Chinese against the forces of imperialism has been, in the eyes of their leaders, a triumphant success. This flush of victory has contributed to the absolute conviction that the course upon which they are embarked is the only one for China.

The Chinese Communists have clearly demonstrated certain capabilities necessary to implement a regional strategy in Latin America. Most important of these are the following:

- Export of doctrine
- Provision of training specialists
- Diplomatic representation
- Infiltration and exfiltration
- Party organization
- Propaganda dissemination
- Economic support


Some of the above capabilities owe their strength primarily to the Soviet Union, principally those of diplomatic representation, party organization and, to a lesser extent, propaganda dissemination and economic support. In no case; however, is Chinese dependence upon the USSR complete.

Although the process of inductive reasoning is far from infallible, it appears that the specific indications support the national objectives set forth in Chapter 4. Weakening U.S. influence and expanding Communism in the region is in almost complete accord with the objectives of International Communism. If we believe that the Sino-Soviet rift is real, it is safe to assume that the Chinese would seek to dominate the regional Communist movement. Therefore, although these three strategic objectives cannot be proven, we can at least say that the weight of evidence points heavily toward their validity.

The courses of action set forth in the strategic concept are likewise somewhat enigmatic. Almost certainly they could be stated somewhat differently and be just as close to the truth. However, the courses of action set forth in Chapter 4 do check favorably with the capabilities and means available to the Chinese Communists to implement them. Furthermore, the indicators that are available to the researcher tend to support them.

We must conclude, therefore, that a reasonable attempt has been made in the light of available evidence to create a realistic version of the Chinese Communist national strategy in Latin America. The author makes no guarantees that this product completely satisfies the U.S. requirement for such a strategy. Quite contrarily, he strongly feels that more evidence should be gathered and evaluated by others in an effort to challenge or refine these conclusions. For

the Chinese are clearly embarked on the road to world domination,
and the target of their protracted march is the entire Western
world.


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(Testimony of Jules Dubois, Latin American correspondent, Chicago Tribune; Stanley Ross, editor, El Tiempo; Enrique Chan, Miami, Fla.; and Emilio Julian Navarro, Miami, Fla.)

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